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United States Supreme Court opinions. Our findings suggest hat not only do
people, by and large, not know their rights, but that when they try to figure out
which rights they possess, the current procedural regime leads them to perform
even worse than chance. Rights knowledge is not correlated with demographic
factors such as race, social class, or even prior experience as a subject of
criminal investigation.
Furthermore, we find that a sense of personal efficacy in police-citizen
interactions, specifically the willingness to assert rights, is positively correlated
with social position. That is, people in higher social classes, and who possess
more cultural capital, are willing to assert their rights more frequently than
people in lower social classes, and who have less social capital. This finding
challenges the framework of rights assertion as a decision-making process in
which every citizen has, in practice, an opportunity to use the rights she
possesses. By assuming that all citizens have the agency necessary to assert
their rights, the Court ensconces inequality into criminal procedure doctrine,
creating a regime that gives some groups of people greater practical access to
their rights. Since rights invocation during police-citizen encounters is one
selection mechanism for determining who enters the criminal justice system in
the first place, our findings point to a hidden source of inequality in American
criminal justice, suggesting new directions for research and policy.
1. INTRODUCTION: RIGHTS ON THE GROUND; RIGHTS IN COURT
When we talk about a person's "use" or "assertion" of a constitutional right
in an interaction with the police, we are usually referring to a psychosocial
process involving at least two components: (1) the person's knowledge or belief
that he has the right, and (2) his willingness or agency to assert it.' At first blink,
neither component seems particularly onerous or problematic. As Justice
Kennedy asked semi-rhetorically during oral argument in United States v.
Drayton: "An American citizen has to protect his [own] rights once in a
while . .. that's a bad thing?"2
The Court has tended to assume, in Drayton and elsewhere, both implicitly
and explicitly, that a citizen who lacks knowledge of his basic constitutional
I. Depending on the situation, "asserting" a right may refer to a person's (a) exercising the
right and (b) asserting that he is exercising it. See, e.g., Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178
(2013) (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 425, 427 (1984); Quinn v. United States, 349
U.S. 155, 164 (1955)) (explaining that both (a) and (b) are necessary when asserting a Fifth
Amendment claim). But see, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 205-06 (2002) (implying
that in a Fourth Amendment "free to leave" situation, a person can simply walk away and she need
not announce that in doing so, she is exercising her Fourth Amendment rights). For our purposes
here, we collapse (a) and (b), referring simply to "assertion"-by which we mean (a) and/or (b) as
required for a right to be recognized in a particular investigative context.
2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (No.
01-631) (emphasis added).
446 [VOL. 66: 445
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol66/iss2/4
2014] FACT AND FICTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
rights has only himself to blame.3  And absent unconstitutional coercion, his
decision about whether to assert a right he knows he possesses is a product of his
*4own ratiocination.
Perhaps because "using" a right seems so simple and self-evident-and
despite robust literatures in legal consciousness and constitutional criminal
procedure-almost no work has examined the on-the-ground social realities of
rights assertion in police-citizen interactions. These social realities are the foci
of this Article; specifically, we concentrate on two empirical questions. First,
are people aware of the rights they might wish to use in encounters with the
police? Second, are they willing and able to assert them if the need arises?
The Court regularly makes normative judgments about precisely these
questions, as it did in 2013's "sleeper case"5 of the year, Salinas v. Texas.6
Police suspected Genovevo Salinas of two murders and asked him to come to the
station so they could take photographs and to clear him as a suspect.7 Salinas
went in voluntarily, was not Mirandized, and answered officers' questions for
about an hour.8 Following an inquiry about the murder weapon, however, he
ceased talking.9 At trial, the prosecution introduced Salinas's silence as
evidence of his guilt, arguing that an innocent man would have either kept
answering the police's questions or protested about being asked questions about
the murder weapon at all.10 The Court did not reach the issue of whether
prosecutors' use of pre-arrest silence as evidence of guilt violates the Fifth
Amendment, however.I' Instead, the Court held that in any event, Salinas had
no Fifth Amendment protection since he had said nothing to explicitly invoke his
right to silence.12 In his opinion for the majority, Justice Alito wrote, "A suspect
who stands mute has not done enouph to put police on notice that he is relying
on his Fifth Amendment privilege."
3. See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206-07 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 227 (1973)) (explaining that police need not tell individuals of their rights to refuse a
warrantless search).
4. Id. at 207.
5. Christened as such by Orin Kerr on the popular legal blog, The Volokh Conspiracy. Orin
Kerr, Do You Have a Right to Remain Silent? Thoughts on the "Sleeper" Criminal Procedure Case
of the Term, Salinas v. Texas, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 17, 2013, 8:11 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2013/06/17/do-you-have-a-right-to-remain-silent-thoughts-on-the-sleeper-
criminal-procedure-case-of-the-term-salinas-v-texas.
6. 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013).
7. Id. at 2185 (quoting Brief of Appellant at 3, Salinas v. Texas, No. PD-0570-l I (Tex.
Crim. App. Jan. 11, 2012)).
8. Id. at 2177-78.
9. Id.
10. Id at 2185 (quoting Salinas v. Texas, 368 S.W.3d 550, 556 (Tex. App. 2011)).
11. Id at 2179.
12. Id at 2180.
13. Id. at 2182 (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1976); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447
U.S. 231, 240 (1980)).
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The Salinas majority did not engage with any questions related to what law
and society scholars term "legal consciousness"-that is, how people
subjectively understand and experience the law.14 The opinion omits discussion
of how criminal procedure really operates. For example, do people know their
rights? Should we expect them to? Are any situations too legally complex to
expect that the average citizen will know which rights apply?'5 The most
unsettling aspect of Salinas is not necessarily the Court's conclusion, but the
unstated premises on which it rests. Two conclusions are possible: either the
Court believed it was realistic for someone in Salinas's position to have this
level of rights knowledge, or the Court knew that this level of rights knowledge
might be unrealistic, but found this unproblematic (or simply did not know and
did not care).16
The dissent showed more interest in Salinas's legal consciousness.17 Justice
Breyer contemplated the encounter from a citizen's point of view and clearly set
out his assumptions:
The nature of the surroundings, the switch of topic, the particular
question-all suggested that the right we have and generally know we
have was at issue at the critical moment here. Salinas, not being
represented by counsel, would not likely have used the precise words
"Fifth Amendment" to invoke his rights because he would not likely
have been aware of technical legal requirements, such as a need to
identify the Fifth Amendment by name.
Although Justice Breyer's conclusions seem eminently reasonable, they are
normative assertions-and it is unclear what they are founded upon. Common
sense? The cultural ubiquity of the Miranda rights?
Periodically, the Court has lamented the dearth of research on which it can
rely in assessin people's use and understanding of their rights in interactions
with the police. Six years before Salinas was handed down, Justice Breyer
14. See id. at 2190 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15. What non-lawyer, after all, would be able to ascertain from the Fifth Amendment's text
the notion that his silence can be used against him before he is Mirandized (unless he asserts it
outright), but not after he is Mirandized? See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. An additional conclusion is that the Salinas Court did not contemplate the effect of a
person's rights knowledge level, but this seems unlikely.
17. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2189-90 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 2190 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
19. See David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment's
Seizure Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 51, 87 (2009) (explaining that the small handful
of studies that have examined these issues have also called for more research, including the
presentation of subjects with "more complicated scenarios" and collecting more demographic
information from respondents). The instant Article accomplishes both of these things.
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commented during oral argument in Brendlin v. California20 about the difficulty
of assessing whether a person would have felt free to leave:
So what do we do if we don't know? I can follow my instinct. My
instinct is he would feel he wasn't free because the [police's] red light's
flashing. That's just one person's instinct. Or I could say, let's look for
some studies. They could have asked people about this and there are
21none.
Indeed, he is correct; little or no existing research speaks to these kinds of
questions.22 This Article, then, begins to fill a large and important void in
criminal procedure scholarship.
II. WHAT WE KNow ABOUT How RIGHTS WORK
Despite the richness of the doctrinal scholarship in constitutional criminal
procedure, surprisingly little is known about how Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment rights function in practice.23 Empirical studies of criminal
procedure remain relatively rare, particularly compared to the mass of empirical
24work on crime and criminal justice institutions. The legal consciousness and
rights consciousness literatures, usually situated within the law and society
literature, are a useful starting point for theoretically-grounded empirical
scholarship on constitutional criminal procedure, though to date the vast majority
of this literature has focused on civil law.25 The procedural justice work within
psychology may offer some useful insights as well. In this section, we describe
the state of the empirical literature on rights knowledge, assertion, and closely
related questions, and then give a brief overview of how the work on legal
consciousness and procedural justice might be useful going forward.
20. 551 U.S. 249 (2007).
21. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007) (No. 06-
8120). Justice Breyer continues: "Or I could say, well, you're the State of California, you're the
ones able to get the studies; you could tell some of those professors, you know, to stop thinking
about whatever they're thinking about and go ask a few practical questions."
22. Kessler, supra note 19, at 61.
23. See, e.g., Kathryne M. Young, Rights Consciousness in Criminal Procedure: A
Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry, 12 Soc. CRIME L. & DEVIANCE 67, 88 (2009) (discussing the
need for more empirical research related to constitutional rights and their assertion).
24. See generally Robert Weisberg, Empirical Criminal Law Scholarship and the Shif to
Institutions, 65 STAN. L. REv. 1371 (2013) (providing an overview and discussion of the empirical
research on crime and criminal justice institutions).
25. Young, supra note 23, at 88.
449
5
Young and Munsch: Fact and Fiction in Constitutional Criminal Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
A. Rights Knowledge
Although the degree to which ignorance actually facilitates waivers of
constitutional rights in the criminal procedure context remains unknown, a few
studies have shed light on the topic.26 Richard Rogers et al. looked at rights
knowledge with respect to Miranda v. Arizona.2 7 Most Americans think they
know their Miranda rights,28 but it turns out that the Miranda warnings' ubiquity
does not translate into practical knowledge about how rights operate.29 Using
the "Miranda Rights Scale," Rogers et al. measured different groups' knowledge
of various Miranda-related questions-for example, the admissibility of
retracted statements or "off-the-record" comments, whether the "right to an
attorney" included the right to meet in private with that attorney, and whether
Miranda rights can be reasserted after they are waived.30 They concluded that
people have little knowledge of how these rights work in practice: "[Our]
findings suggest most persons can recognize their basic rights to silence and
legal counsel. However, the more critical question is whether they have an
accurate working knowledge of their rights".3 1 The handful of other studies
examining rights knowledge in the criminal procedure context-for example,
Austin Sarat's 1975 survey of 220 Wisconsin adults32 -have reached similarly
dismal conclusions about the degree to which people understand the rights they
possess.
People make suppositions about which rights they hold based on a fairly
predictable sort of "lay jurisprudence."33  They apply broad cultural memes
about criminal procedure, such as, "Everyone has a right to counsel if they're
charged with a crime,"34 or "Police need a warrant to do a search,"35 to particular
26. Id. at 76.
27. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
28. Richard Rogers, A Little Knowledge is a Dangerous Thing ... Emerging Miranda
Research and Professional Roles for Psychologists, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 776, 777 (2008).
29. Young, supra note 23, at 76.
30. See Richard Rogers et al., "Everyone Knows Their Miranda Rights": Implicit
Assumptions and Countervailing Evidence, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 300, 303-05 (2010)
[hereinafter Rogers, Implicit Assumptions] (citations omitted) (thoroughly but concisely describing
the scale's development).
31. Id at 314.
32. Young, supra note 23, at 76 (citing Austin Sarat, Studying American Legal Culture, II
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 427, 479 (1977)). Most of the empirical studies on point were done shortly
after the Warren Court's key criminal procedure cases were handed down. See, e.g., Steven L.
Chanenson, Get the Facts, Jack! Empirical Research and the Changing Constitutional Landscape of
Consent Searches, 71 TENN. L. REV. 399, 454 (2004) (citing lllya D. Lichtenberg, Voluntary
Consent of Obedience to Authority: An Inquiry into the 'Consensual' Police-Citizen Encounter
250-51 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University) (on file with author))
(explaining that "most people were unaware of their legal right to refuse" searches).
33. Young, supra note 23, at 81, 88.
34. Id. at 81.
35. Id. at 80.
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situations, which often (unsurprisingly) leads them to erroneous conclusions.36
For example, if a person believes that every defendant has a right to counsel, he
may assume that this applies even to misdemeanors that carry no jail time.37 Or,
if he believes that the police need a warrant to conduct a search, he may gather
that this is true even in his car.38 Lay jurisprudence does not just lead to errors in
general; it leads to predictable errors, creating patterns that can render people
vulnerable to exploitation.39
While criminal procedure is not the only substantive area in which people
hold legal misunderstandings,4 0 legal knowledge is especially important in
criminal procedure, because in many situations, people have to assert a right at a
given point in time or else it is waived.41 A person's understanding of the
Miranda warning's implications, for instance, has immediate consequences for
the decisions she makes in her interactions with the police.4 2 For example, she
might not ask, "What is going to happen to me now?" if she knew that her
question constituted a willingness to speak to police without counsel.43 Unlike
assertions of the right to silence or counsel, waivers of these rights can take
place unwittingly.4
36. Id; see generally Rogers, Implicit Assumptions, supra note 30, at 303-05 (discussing
people's misconceptions about how the Miranda rights apply in various situations).
37. However, no right to counsel attaches to misdemeanors that do not carry jail time as a
possible punishment. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367, 373-74 (1979).
38. Not so, of course. See Carroll v. United States, 267 US. 132, 162 (1925). Lay
jurisprudence is probably undergirded by another process as well: "In the absence of a clear
understanding of the law, it would appear that people tend to assume it concurs with what they think
it ought to be." Pascoe Pleasence & Nigel J. Balmer, Ignorance in Bliss: Modeling Knowledge of
Rights in Marriage and Cohabitation, 46 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 297, 323 (2012) (citing Lee Ross,
David Greene & Pamela House, The "False Consensus Effect": An Egocentric Bias in Social
Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 279, 294 (1976)); see
also John Darley et al., The Ex Ante Function of the Criminal Law, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 165,
185-86 (2001) (suggesting that people's beliefs about the content of the criminal law in their own
state track their beliefs about what the criminal law should be).
39. Young, supra note 23, at 83.
40. See, e.g., Pleasence & Balmer, supra note 38, at 330 (detailing people's erroneous beliefs
about cohabitation and marriage law).
41. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 277 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("It wholly escapes me how our citizens can meaningfully be said to have waived something as
precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever being aware of its existence").
42. Young, supra note 23, at 86.
43. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1042, 1045 (1983).
44. See, e.g., Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2176-77 (2013) (citing Minnesota v.
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1984)) (explaining, "it is settled that forfeiture of the privilege
against self-incrimination need not be knowing").
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B. Rights Assertion
Although scholars have noted that normative questions in constitutional
criminal procedure frequently hinge on empirical facts,45 empirical work in
criminal procedure, and particularly on rights assertion, has not been nearly as
plentiful as in other areas of criminal justice.46 Nor does the sociological
literature on rights-claiming often delve into the criminal realm.4 7  The few
notable exceptions are worth describing in some detail.
In 2009, David K. Kessler published the results of an interview study that
examined perceived freeness to leave.48 Using a "man-on-the-street"-type
interview design, Kessler approached Boston residents and asked whether they
would feel free to leave if a police officer approached them on (1) a sidewalk or
(2) on a bus and said, "I have a few questions to ask you." 49  Perhaps
unsurprisingly, most people reported that they would not feel free to leave (a
finding especially pronounced, in Kessler's study, among women and people
under age 25).50 While the study has methodological shortcomings, the analyses
are useful. Because Kessler looked at whether people knew a particular right
and were willing to assert that same right, he was able to examine the effects of
pre-existing knowledge of rights on a person's reaction to an encounter with the
police.5  He concluded that even though "freeness-to-leave" scores remained
45. See, e.g., Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion,
2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 155 (2003) (stating that "[t]he question of whether a citizen feels free to
terminate a police encounter depends crucially on certain empirical claims").
46. Chanenson, supra note 32, at 469; Meares & Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent
Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 733, 735 (2000); Tracey L. Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in
Criminal Law and Procedure-and Three Answers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 851, 873 (2002).
47. See, e.g., Calvin Morrill et al., Legal Mobilization in Schools: The Paradox of Rights and
Race Among Youth, 44 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 651, 652-53 (2010) (examining youths' perceptions of
rights violations); Deborah Brake & Joanna Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-
Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 861 (2008) (discussing rights claiming under Title VII);
David Engel & Frank Munger, Rights, Remembrance, and the Reconciliation ofDifference, 30 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 7, 10-11 (1996) (describing the meaning of rights through the lens of individuals'
experiences with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990). Differences between civil and
criminal law make it difficult to generalize across both kinds of cases about how rights assertion
operates. For one, violations of rights in the criminal context are most likely to occur in the context
of a criminal prosecution, when the claimant is also a criminal defendant. Pamela S. Karlan, The
Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1915 (2007).
Exclusion of evidence is the typical remedy sought; the claim of a rights violation is used as a
shield, not as a sword. Id. Other differences include timeliness of assertion (many Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendment rights are waived if not raised during an interaction with police), and the
availability of counsel in criminal trials (which may affect the likelihood that rights-claiming will
occur). See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241, 277 (1973).
48. Kessler, supra note 19.
49. Id. at 68, 88.
50. Id. at 77.
51. Id. at 78.
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low across the board, a person's knowledge of a right made her significant
more likely to predict that she would assert it in an encounter with the police.
People's general unwillingness to terminate interactions with the police, Kessler
concludes, calls into question the Court's characterization of what a "reasonable"
person's interactions with the police really look like.53
Alisa M. Smith et al. conducted a related study a few years later, also testing
courts' normative assumptions about consensual encounters in the Fourth
Amendment context.54 Their experimental design was intended to approximate
the interactions between citizens and police.55  Acting as confederates, four
campus security guards stopped eighty-three passersby (singly and in groups),
and asked them to identify themselves and explain their reasons for being on
campus.6 Everyone stopped and complied with the requests. After each
encounter, the researchers conducted a brief interview to better understand what
the interaction had been like from the participant's point of view. The most
noteworthy finding was that although most subjects viewed the encounter as
consensual, most of them also reported not having felt free to leave it, which, of
course, challenges the idea that such encounters are "consensual" at all. 59
Situational factors, such as the number of officers or whether the encounter
occurred indoors or outdoors, had no effect on how people perceived the
encounters.60  Unfortunately, the authors did not collect information about
participants' socioeconomic status, but since all participants were recruited at a
small private university, this factor probably did not vary greatly. The study also
contained only sixteen nonwhite participants.61
In general, the few previous empirical studies of constitutional criminal
procedure have focused specifically on one as ect of criminal procedure rather
than on broader questions of rights assertion. Additionally, previous studies
52. Id at 79.
53. Id at 81-82 (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)).
54. Alisa M. Smith, Erik Dolgoff & Dana Stewart Speer, Testing Judicial Assumptions of the
"Consensual" Encounter: An Experimental Study, 14 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 285, 291 (2013).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 300-01. This design, too, has its shortcomings-most notably, all of the encounters
took place at a private college campus, where the public, presumably, had no right to be present. Id.
at 300 n.99. Depending on the school's policies, the subjects approached by the security guards may
have been required to comply with the guards' request. Additionally, students on a college campus
may have a different relationship with the police than with campus security guards, and a person's
behavior at the private college she attends may be different from her behavior in public.
Nonetheless, the design is impressive, given the difficulty of constructing an experiment that
approximates encounters with police.
57. Id. at 318.
58. Id at 301.
59. Id at 319-20.
60. Id. at 303-04.
61. Id. at 302.
62. In addition to the studies described above, there have been a few others. See, e.g., Rogers,
Implicit Assumptions, supra note 30, at 302 (citing Rogers et al., Knowing and Intelligent: A Study
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have rarely looked at the relationship between rights knowledge or assertion, on
one hand, and demographic factors such as race, gender, or socioeconomic status
on the other.63 And while ample research has described the factors that affect
government actors' decision-making at various stages of criminal investigation
and adjudication, few are concerned with the factors that affect the behaviors of
an investigation's subjects.64 Perhaps a citizen's behavior is less outcome-
predictive than the police's-but assuming that a person's Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendment rights have any teeth, this should not necessarily be so.
C Other Relevant Literatures
"Legal consciousness" typically describes how everyday actors think about,
relate to, and act with regard to, the law.65  Formally, much of this work,
including "rights consciousness" (the literature which looks more specifically at
how people understand and employ various rights), is situated within sociology,
anthropology, or law and society studies.66 This body of research theorizes the
processes that underpin people's "commonsense understandings of the way the
law works,"67 and is especially concerned with differences between the law "on
the books" and the law "on the ground."68 Laura Beth Nielsen has written that
"comprehending the most basic functions of rights requires the empirical study
of rights consciousness and claiming behavior. This perspective . . .places the
study of ordinary citizens' understandings of rights, and what actions they take
based on that knowledge, at the forefront of an empirical research agenda."69
of Miranda Warnings in Mentally Disordered Defendants, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 401 (2007)
[hereinafter Rogers, Knowing and Intelligent]; Rogers et al., The Language ofMiranda Warnings in
American Jurisdictions: A Replication and Vocabulary Analysis, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 124
(2008) [hereinafter Rogers, Language of Miranda]) (These studies have "explored the reasons
expressed by pretrial defendants for exercising or waiving their Miranda rights. Such reasons
suggested that many defendants had incomplete or inaccurate knowledge of their Miranda rights
and other relevant data affecting their waiver decisions (e.g., not asking for counsel due to a lack of
funds).").
63. Young, supra note 23, at 84.
64. Weisberg, supra note 24, at 1372-73.
65. LAURA BETH NIELSEN, LICENSE TO HARASS: LAW, HIERARCHY, AND OFFENSIVE
PUBLIC SPEECH 5 (Princeton Univ. Press ed., 2004) (citing PATRICK EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY,
THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 82 (William O'Barr & John M.
Conley eds., 1998)).
66. See id. at 6 (citing ROBERTO UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM
OF SOCIAL THEORY (Free Press ed., 1976)).
67. Id at 7.
68. Id at 8 (quoting AUSTIN SARAT & THOMAS R. KEARNS, LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21, 23
(Univ. of Mich. Press ed., 1995)).
69. LAURA BETH NIELSEN, THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF RIGHTS xi (Laura
Beth Nielsen ed., 2007) (citing KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS (John Hopkins Univ. Press ed., 1988); THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS,
LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS 183 (Berkeley: Univ. of Cal. Press ed., 1988); MICHAEL W.
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Paradigms described by Nielsen, Patricia Ewick, Susan Silbey, and others,
suggest that there are patterns in how people relate to law,70 and that these
patterns derive in large part from their individual experiences and social
locations. 71  Others, such as Rebecca Sandefur, have found that social
experience, including socioeconomic status, "creat[es] dispositions that come to
colour future behavior" regarding people's use and understanding of the law.72
In a variety of civil law contexts, people's attitudes toward the justiciability of
rights and legal problems appear to be influenced by their backgrounds.73 Calvin
Morrill and others have found, for example, that race affects whether youth
choose to take formal legal action in response to perceived harassment.74
Though typically not considered part of the legal consciousness literature,
social psychological work on procedural justice is closely related to, and sheds
light on, how people perceive law and legal actors.75 Procedural justice is the
sense that an outcome was reached by just procedures-for example, that a judge
treated the parties to a lawsuit fairly, or that all of the parties involved received a
fair hearing. Most centrally, Tom Tyler and others have found that people care
deeply about how the criminal justice system interacts with them.76 The effects
MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION
(Chicago: Univ. of Chi. Press ed., 1994); Michael McCann & Tracey March, Law and Everyday
Forms ofResistance: a Social Political Assessment, in 15 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY
225 (Austin Sarat ed., 1996); Laura B. Nielsen, The Work of Rights and the Work Rights Do: A
Critical Empirical Approach, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 63-79
(Austin Sarat ed., Oxford: Blackwell Pub. 2004)).
70. See id.; PATRICK EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES
FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 17 (William O'Barr & John M. Conley eds., 1998). Identity and personal
narrative are particularly key in shaping rights consciousness, and affects their self-perception as
rights holders. See, e.g., JOH-N GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE,
AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 70-71 (Univ. of Chi. Press ed., 2001) (discussing experiences of
people on welfare and under surveillance); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING
EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS 37 (Univ. of Chi. Press ed.,
1990) (an ethnographic study of how people's experience with the law and the process of litigation
affects their legal consciousness).
71. Laura Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of
Ordinary Citizens and Street Harassment, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1055, 1056 (2000).
72. Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing: Everyday Problems and
Responses of Inaction, in TRANSFORMING LIVES: LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS 112, 127 (Pascoe
Pleasence, Alexy Buck & Nigel J. Balmer eds., 2007) [hereinafter Sandefur, The Importance of
Doing Nothing]; see generally Young, supra note 23, at 68-73 (citations omitted) (providing a more
in-depth discussion of rights consciousness in the context of criminal procedure).
73. Sandefur, The Importance ofDoing Nothing, supra note 72, at 117.
74. Morrill, supra note 47, at 684.
75. See Kathryne M. Young, Everyone Knows the Game: Legitimacy and Legal
Consciousness in the Hawaiian Cockfight, 48 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 499 (2014) (discussing the
relationship between legal consciousness and procedural justice).
76. Tom Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluations of Their
Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 51, 53 (1984); see also Linda D. Molm et al., In the
Eye of the Beholder: Procedural Justice in Social Exchange, 68 AM. Soc. REV. 128, 128 (2003)
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of a negative substantive outcome are tempered by the perception that one has
been treated fairly.77 Conversely, a person's satisfaction with a positive outcome
is reduced if she does not believe that it was reached through fair procedures.
This holds true in both civil and criminal cases.79 If people believe they are
treated fairly, they trust legal institutions more-from the police to the Supreme
Courto -and are more likely both to obey legal authorities and comply with the
law. 8 Procedural justice work has also explored the correlation between trust in
the police and various demographic factors, as well as the correlation between
trust in the police and other kinds of involvement in the criminal justice
system.82 However, these findings are potentially problematic because
procedural justice holds the potential to increase obedience to, and trust in, the
law. Our concern echoes the concerns of Robert J. MacCoun, Craig Haney, and
(discussing how different forms of social exchange affect people's perceptions about fairness and
justice).
77. See Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of
Procedural Fairness, I ANN. REV. L. & Soc. ScI. 171, 176 (2005) (citing Tyler, supra note 76, at
54; Tom Tyler, What is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used By Citizens to Assess the Fairness of
Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV 103 (1988); Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice
in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV 483 (1988)). We have an abiding concern that the
procedural justice literature's occupation with people's experiential, process-driven satisfaction not
only overvalues compliance, but opens a door to the use of process as palliative, easing a path to
substantively unjust outcomes. See also Craig Haney, The Fourteenth Amendment and Symbolic
Legality: Let Them Eat Due Process, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 183, 201 (1991) (arguing that in the
Fourth Amendment context, procedural protections are "poor substitutes for genuine or meaningful
equal protection remedies").
78. This finding has been replicated many times, and appears to hold across contexts. See,
e.g., Molm, supra note 76, at 128-29; John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory ofProcedure, 66
CAL. L. REV. 541, 566 (1978); Tyler, supra note 76, at 54.
79. See, e.g., Casper et al., supra note 77, at 483-84 (citations omitted).
80. Tyler, supra note 76, at 51-52, 70 (citations omitted).
81. TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 178 (Yale Univ. Press ed., 2006).
82. Curiously, though, there has been little or no work on how well people's satisfaction with
the law aligns with the law's substance. That is, do the legal provisions of due process align with the
kinds of process that make people feel like the legal system is trustworthy? How is rights-claiming
shaped by identity and experience in people's encounters with the police? Does a meaningful
opportunity to exercise constitutional rights correlate with feelings of "satisfaction" about the
criminal justice system? I have previously characterized this set of inquiries as "procedural rights
consciousness." See infra note 85 and accompanying text. Although this line of work is related to
the procedural justice literature, and may seem similar on the surface, since both are concerned with
how people experience legal procedures, it is quite different in several respects. For one, procedural
rights consciousness is theoretically rooted in legal consciousness's broad, identity-based
perspective. Procedural rights consciousness is also less concerned with people's obedience to the
law than with their willingness to employ it, making it more focused on self-efficacy than on
compliance. See Tyler, supra note 76, at 51-52 (citations omitted). Additionally, procedural rights
consciousness is deeply concerned not with the relationship between the treatment people receive
and their satisfaction with law, but with the relationship between the procedural law on the books
and the on-the-ground realities of how procedure operates from the perspective of the people subject
to it. See Tom Tyler, What is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used By Citizens to Assess the Fairness
ofLegal Procedures, 22 LAW& SOC'Y REV 103, 132 (1988).
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others who have pointed out procedural justice's potential for manipulating
individuals into obedience--or at least dissuading them from questioning legal
authority-by making them feel placated.
Little is known about whether the factors people associate with procedural
fairness actually align with legal requirements. Procedural justice research has
rarely focused on substantive constitutional criminal procedure, which has
mostly remained the province of legal scholars' doctrinal analysis. Still, such
research has heavily influenced the policing literature, and has spurred critiques
of "order-maintenance" policing, which critics argue has negative implications
for police legitimacy and crime control efforts via its potential to damage
84citizens' views of procedural justice.
One vein of legal scholarship that touches on what the first author has
termed "procedural rights consciousness" is the work connecting poverty and
privacy in the criminal context.85  Christopher Slobogin has documented
manifold ways in which socioeconomic status matters in criminal procedure.86
He describes this pattern in several search and seizure contexts, characterizing it
as the "poverty exception" to the Fourth Amendment8: the inability of the poor
to afford structural measures that signify a "reasonable expectation of privacy"88
and the forced surrender of privacy in order to receive benefits.89  Michele
Gilman also describes the disparate treatment poor people receive.90 They are
disproportionately subjects of surveillance, on which their government benefits
(such as welfare) are contingent.9 1 At the same time, the government benefits
more commonly enjoyed by people who are not poor, such as tax breaks or farm
83. See MacCoun, supra note 77, at 180-81 (citations omitted); see also Haney, supra note
77, at 201-02.
84. Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance Policing:
A Study oflnner-City Young Men's Perceptions ofPolice Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q. 255, 261 (2010)
(citing Delores Jones-Brown, Forever the Symbolic Assailant: The More Things Change, the More
they Remain the Same, 6 CRIM. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 105 (2007)).
85. See Young, supra note 23, at 85 (quoting Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to Civil Justice
and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality, 34 ANN. REV. OF SOCIOLOGY 339, 341 (2008) [hereinafter
Sandefur, Civil Justice]) (citing GILLIOM, supra note 70, at 70-71); supra text accompanying note
47.
86. Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV.
391, 400 (2003).
87. Id
88. Id. at 400-01.
89. Id at 403 (citing Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 316-17 (1971); Camara v. Mun. Ct.,
387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967); WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT §2.4(b), 531 (West ed., 3d ed. 1996)) ("Those suspected of tax fraud get full Fourth
Amendment protection; those suspected of welfare fraud get none."); see also Michele E. Gilman,
The Class Diferential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1389, 1389-90 (2012) (discussing
the failure of privacy law to address the privacy concerns of the poor).
90. Gilman, supra note 89, at 1389-90.
91. Id at 1396-97.
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subsidies, are not contingent upon the recipients' surrender of privacy to the
government.92
II. METHODOLOGY
A. Survey Design and Sampling Procedures
The survey comprised three parts. Part One presented five short vignettes,
each written in the second person point of view. Respondents were asked to put
themselves in the shoes of someone who was innocent of any wrongdoing but
would prefer to refuse a search or end an interaction with police. For example,
the first vignette read:
(1) One day before you leave for work, an officer knocks on your door
and says that there have been drug sales reported on your block. He
says you don't have to let him in, but that he's checking the homes in
the suspected area, and that it will only take 20 minutes. You are
already late for an important meeting. You have nothing illegal in your
house. Do you let the officer search?93
In each vignette, the reader was told that he had a specific right and was
asked whether he would assert it. The purpose of disclosing the state of the law
92. Id. at 1431 (citing Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 790, 814 (2007)).
93. The other rights assertion vignettes state as follows:
(2) The company you work for is being investigated, and a few people, including you and your
boss, are arrested at work. The police take you to the station, read you your rights, and start asking
questions. You're 100 percent sure that you have not done anything wrong. You have the right to
remain silent if you wish. Do you answer the police's questions?
(3) A friend asks you if you'll give one of her friends, Ben, a ride to work. You've never met
Ben, but you agree. You pick Ben up, and a few minutes later, he slips something into his pocket
that you are sure is marijuana. He looks at you and says, "It's no big deal." Distracted, you run a red
light and are pulled over by a police officer, who asks you both to step out of the vehicle. Before
Ben gets out, he tosses the marijuana under your seat. The officer writes you a ticket, then asks
whether she can search your car. You know the drugs are under your seat, and you don't trust Ben
to tell the truth. You have the right to refuse. Do you let the officer search?
(4) You're taking a bus trip with friends, and you're using a duffel bag to carry your things
After an hour, the driver stops the bus and two policemen in uniforms get on. They announce that
they want to conduct a search. To your surprise, one of the officers walks up to you and asks to look
in your bag. You have some very embarrassing items inside, but nothing illegal. You don't want
your friends, or a bus full of strangers, to see what's inside. You know you have the right to say no.
Do you allow the cop to search your bag?
(5) One morning, police knock on your door and tell you that they are investigating a robbery
that happened the night before. The same kind of car you own was seen driving away from the
scene, and they are questioning a few people in the area who drive that kind of car. You were home
alone all night, watching television. Do you ask for a lawyer before answering their questions?
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was to "control" for rights knowledge. That is, we wanted to examine people's
willin ness to assert a right irrespective of their previous knowledge of that
right. At the conclusion of each vignette, the respondent was asked to indicate
whether she would assert her right.95  After each yes or no answer, the
respondent was asked, "Why or why not?" and given space to explain her
answer.
Though vignette studies are common in social science research, they have
the disadvantage of being based on hypothetical actions.96 Kessler's work
suggests that people may overestimate the likelihood that they will assert their
rights when the situation actually arises.97 Thus, the vignettes used here are
probably a conservative estimate of people's willingness to comply with police
requests.98 Additionally, insofar as the survey measures rights consciousness, as
opposed to rates of assertion, people's prediction about whether they would
assert their rights is useful in understanding the degree to which they perceive
themselves as having agency in police-citizen encounters.
The second part of the survey was a ten-question rights knowledge
inventory. Each was based on a Supreme Court case and asked about an issue of
settled law in constitutional criminal procedure. For example, questions
included:
* If you put your trash in sealed bags out on the curb for
pickup, can the police come and look through it
whenever they want?99
* Steve is charged with cruelty to animals, a
misdemeanor in his state punishable by either fines or
community service. Steve's case goes to trial in front
of a jury, and Steve can't afford a lawyer. Does he
have a right to have a lawyer provided?'0
94. Vignettes were pre-tested for clarity, and the names used in the vignettes were pre-tested
to make sure they were racially ambiguous. Each scenario also specified that in the hypothetical, the
respondent herself had not participated in illegal activity. We did this so that actual criminality
would not be a factor. For example, we did not want someone to answer that he would refuse to let
the police search his home because he generally has marijuana lying around.
95. To ensure that presentation did not affect our results, some questions were phrased in the
negative-whether a respondent would allow police to search or not, whether he would refuse a
search or not, etc.
96. Morrill, supra note 47, at 686.
97. See Kessler, supra note 19, at 87.
98. Still, there is no reason to believe that this skewing would correlate with other variables,
so differences between groups of respondents would likely hold.
99. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43-44 (1988).
100. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (holding that a state has no obligation
to provide counsel for a defendant who is not actually sentenced to imprisonment, even if the
applicable statute authorized imprisonment); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972)
(holding that a defendant may not be sentenced to imprisonment for a misdemeanor offense if the
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The questions required some knowledge of rights but were not based on
outlandish or improbable investigative scenarios, nor on very recent legal
developments.10
Lastly,102 respondents were asked to answer demographic questions about
themselves, including race,103 gender, prior searches or arrests by police, and the
level of education attained by their parents or guardians.104
state did not provide counsel).
The other cases on which questions were based were: United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630,
644 (2004); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623-24 (2004); Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 40 (2001); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 432 (1986); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459 (1981) (note that the survey was
administered before Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) was handed down); Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979), Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978), Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978); and United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992). The text of all ten questions is available upon request.
101. Parts 1 and 2 were put in the order listed above (first the rights knowledge questions, and
then the rights assertion questions) for several reasons. Most importantly, pre-testing showed that
after completing the rights knowledge inventory, respondents sometimes referenced that section in
responding to the rights assertion vignettes-e.g., "After answering those other questions, I realized
I don't know my rights at all, so I'd better get a lawyer." However, the reverse was not true-i.e.,
putting the rights assertion section first did not affect people's rights knowledge scores. We also
ensured that none of the rights that people were told about in the rights assertion section (Part 1)
could be construed as answering any of the rights knowledge questions (Part 2). See Kathryne M.
Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data, at Question 6 (on file with authors).
102. This section came last for two reasons. For one, people tend to answer demographic
questions the same way regardless of where they appear in a survey. See Robert Teclaw et al.,
Demographic Question Placement: Effect on Item Response Rates and Means of a Veterans Health
Administration Survey, 27 J. Bus. & PSYCHOL. 281, 286 (2012). Putting these questions last may
have reduced the risk of survey fatigue; but on the other hand, it may have reduced the rate of
response to these questions. Id. But more importantly, asking respondents about their race, then
asking them questions about the criminal justice system, increases the likelihood of a race-based
effect-just as asking people their gender before a math test results in poorer performance by
women. See Steven J. Spencer et al., Stereotype Threat and Women's Math Performance, 35 J.
EXPERIMENTAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 4, 25-26 (1999); see also Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson,
Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 810 (1995) (describing stereotype threat and the effect of pre-examination
questions about race on test performance). Putting this section last likely increased the validity of
Parts 1 and 2. It might be worth doing an altogether different study to examine people's willingness
to assert their rights if race was made salient before scenarios were presented.
103. Respondents could choose multiple races, identify as mixed-race, or write in a race not
listed. We believe this allowed people to more fully describe their identity, although as discussed,
we were ultimately not able to perform as fine-grained an analysis of racial effects as we would
have liked. See infra Part VI.B.
104. See Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data, at Question 29 (on file with
authors).
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B. Sampling
Participants for the study were recruited from two locations: undergraduates
from a highly-ranked private research university in California (n = 108), and
students at a community college ranked in the bottom quartile of California's
two-year colleges (n = 247).1o These two populations provided a sample that
was diverse along several dimensions.1os Additionally, these samples were
chosen so that they could be compared against one another, in order to begin
looking at the role of a particularly elusive factor in sociological research-
"class consciousness" or "entitlement"-in how people use their rights. The
community college students may face structural restrictions that, to varying
degrees, we hypothesized may affect rights knowledge and assertion.
Conversely, the private university students may have experienced certain
privileges that impact their orientation to their rights. Written surveys were
distributed at each site in a variety of introductory-level courses in the social
science and humanities that filled general education requirements, including
courses in psychology, economics, history, sociology, and political science.07
IV. RESULTS
A. Sample Characteristics
Table I presents proportions (or means and standard deviations, where
appropriate) for variables used in subsequent analyses, separated by sample-
that is, by whether a respondent attended the university or the community
college. We use chi-squarel09 tests (and t-tests for paired means where
appropriate) to examine differences between the university and community
college students.
105. How Does Your Community College Stack Up?, CNN MONEY,
http://money.cnn.com/pf/college/community-colleges (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
106. As Harmon has noted, scholarship about police conduct tends to focus on conduct that
ends up "at issue in criminal cases." Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L.
REv. 761, 784 (2012). However, since the majority of police-citizen interactions do not result in a
criminal case, we sought to understand how people in general-not just suspects or criminal
defendants-interact with the police. Id. at 784-85.
107. Respondents received course credit for their participation.
108. See infra Appendix, at Table 1. The number of observations varies because of missing
data. While there is relatively little missing data on any one variable, omitting all participants with
missing data on one or more variables (N = 27) results in a loss of approximately 7.6% of the data.
Excluding these cases from all analysis results in substantially similar results. Models are available
upon request.
109. Chi-square is a statistical test commonly used to compare observed data to data we would
expect to obtain by chance. DAVID FREEDMAN, ROBERT PISANI, & ROGER PURVES, STATISTICS
4TH ED. 523-43 (W.W. Norton & Company, 2007).
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As Table I shows, the university sample contained a significantly larger
proportion. of white respondents (.50 compared to .17)110 and respondents who
had at least one parent or guardian with a four-year college degree (.85 compared
to .35)."' The community college sample was, on average, older than the
university sample (the mean ages were 22.04 years and 19.92 years,
respectively)112 and contained a significantly larger proportion of respondents
who self-identified as "other or mixed race" (.70 compared to .39),113 Hispanic
(.53 compared to .08), 114 and non-U.S. citizen (.12 compared to .06). 1s Finally,
the proportion of community college students who had been searched or arrested
(.44) was significantly higher than the proportion of university students who had
been searched or arrested (.19).116
The figures under the titles "rights knowledge" and "rights assertion" in
Table I show between-sample differences in responses to the survey
questions.1 7  On average, respondents from both samples fared worse than
chance on the rights knowledge test."8 Out of a possible 10 points, the pooled
sample mean is 3.97 (standard deviation = 1.43).ll No significant difference
exists between the university students' and community college students'
performance.12 0
Rights assertion, however, was more prominent among university
students.121 In response to all five rights assertion vignettes, respondents from
110. See infra Appendix, at Table I (e (1, n = 355) = 41.47, p < .01). We categorized
respondents into the following racial groups: those who identified only as white or European-
American, those who identified as black or African-American (regardless of whether this was the
only group chosen) and those who fell into neither category. The sample size did not enable as fine-
grained an analysis of race as would have been ideal, but we focused on blackness and whiteness
because of the historical salience of these racial categories in the American criminal justice system.
See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters"-Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth
Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 243-44 (1991) (describing the
impact of race in Fourth Amendment seizures). We chose to define "blackness" this way primarily
because there were not enough respondents who self-identified only as black to allow us to look at
that group separately, and also because black racial consciousness is not dependent on a person's
identifying solely as black.
111. See infra Appendix, at Table 1 (e (1, n = 333) = 72.22, p < .01). The parent/guardian
education variable shown here is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether at least one of the
individuals a respondent listed as a parent or guardian holds a degree from a four-year college or
university.
112. See infra Appendix, at Table I (SD = 6.78 for community college students and 1.21 for
university students, t(349) = 4.71, p <.01).
113. See infra Appendix, at Table 1 (e (1, n = 355) = 30.53, p < .01).
114. See infra Appendix, at Table I (e (1, n = 355) = 61.89, p < .01).
115. See infra Appendix, at Table 1 (X2 (1, n = 352) = 3.57, p <.10).
116. See infra Appendix, at Table 1 (X2 (1, n = 347) = 20.23, p < .01).
117. See infra Appendix, at Table 1.
118. See infra Appendix, at Table 1.
119. See infra Appendix, at Table 1.
120. See infra Appendix, at Table I (t(3 54) = 0.19, p = .84).
121. See infra Appendix, at Table 1.
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the university sample were more likely to assert a right and respondents from the
community college sample were more likely to comply with the policel22 -a
pattern that reached statistical significance in three out of five scenarios.1 23
These findings are especially noteworthy given that there was no significant
difference between samples in terms of rights knowledge.124 In other words, the
university students were more likely to assert their rights than the community
college students.125 The two groups were equally knowledgeable about their
rights, but respondents from the community college sample were more likely to
comply 1 26 with the police.127
B. Rights Knowledge
Table 2, Model 1, shows the effect of several factors on rights knowledge:
sample (that is, whether the respondent was in the university group or the
community college group), gender, age, race, ethnicity, citizenship, and prior
search/arrest by police. We included these variables in the model based on the
theoretical motivations already described, as well as on other researchers'
findings that these variables are salient in the rights assertion and/or criminal
procedure contexts.129 Drawing respondents from a prestigious private
122. See infra Appendix, at Table 1.
123. See infra Appendix, at Table 1.
124. See infra Appendix, at Table 1.
125. See infra Appendix, at Table 1.
126. At various points in this Article, for the sake of simplicity we liken rights assertion to
noncompliance with police, and liken compliance with police to failure to assert a right. It is worth
acknowledging, though, that the items within each pairing are not strictly speaking, synonymous.
Nor are compliance and assertion quite opposites.
127. Precise results for the remaining four questions are as follows:
Question #2 - Police questioning about a work-related investigation: a significantly larger
proportion of the university students compared to the community college students (.62 compared to
.41) claimed they would exercise their right to remain silent and refuse to answer the questions. See
infra Appendix, at Table I (X 2 (1, n= 350) = 13.37, p <.01).
Question #3 - Car search: a larger proportion of the university sample (.85) indicated they
would exercise their right to refuse the search compared to the community college sample (.58), a
statistically significant difference. See infra Appendix, at Table I (X2 (1, n = 350) = 24.32, p < .01).
Question #4 - Bag search: a larger and statistically significant proportion of the university
students (.59) indicated they would refuse the search compared to the community college sample
(.44). See infra Appendix, at Table I (X2 (1, n = 344)= 6.10, p <.01).
Question #5 - Asking for a lawyer at respondent's home: a larger proportion of the university
sample (.50) said they would assert their right to a lawyer compared to the community college
sample (.41). Again, the difference in frequencies between the two samples is significant. See infra
Appendix, at Table I ()e (1, n = 350) = 2.34, p <.10).
128. See infra Appendix, at Table 2.
129. See, e.g., Morrill, supra note 47, 657-58 (citations omitted) (analyzing racial and ethnic
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university and a low-performing community college, provided an additional
measure of status. We intended this variable to serve as a proxy for what Pierre
Bourdieu called "cultural capital"-that is, knowledge, skills, education and
advantages that gives an individual higher status.1 3 0  These are not subjects
taught in schools; rather, they are subjects learned, and values transmitted,
through membership in a certain social class. We argue that the university
students will be more likely than the community college students to have
acquired a mentality of entitlement and privilege that allows them to assert their
rights, regardless of their individual rights knowledge.132 In Model 2, we
introduced parental education, which has a precedent in social science for being
used "as a proxy for material and knowledge-based resources in households
because such resources have been demonstrated in previous research to influence
legal mobilization and socialization."'33
Because the two samples' populations differed in a number of respects,'34
when we pooled the samples, we included a dummy variable to indicate which
sample a respondent was from and examined the interaction between the sample
and each of the variables of interest, including how the main coefficients for the
demographic variables changed with the inclusion of the interaction terms. 135
This ensured that in combining the samples, any significant effects were not
simply due to between-sample differences. For the sake of parsimony, we fitted
a maximal model, then simplified it by removing all non-significant interaction
terms, leaving in main variables of interest.136 Using the same procedure, Model
2 assesses the effect of parental or guardian education on rights knowledge,
130. Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR
THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241, 243 (John G. Richardson ed., Greenwood Press 1986).
131. Id. at 244; see also Paul DiMaggio & John Mohr, Cultural Capital, Educational
Attainment, and Marital Selection, 90 AM. J. SOC. 1231, 1233 (1985) (discussing the effects of
cultural capital on factors such as college attendance, college completion, and selection of a
spouse); Paul DiMaggio, Cultural Capital and School Success: The Impact of Status Culture
Participation on the Grades of U.S. High School Students, 47 AM. Soc. REv. 189, 199 (1982)
(describing the effects of cultural capital on students' high school grades).
132. Attendance at an elite university is not, in itself, the cultural capital to which we are
referring. Rather, it is evidence of the cultural capital required to get there. While this cultural
capital may be more common in individuals with high socioeconomic status, it is not their province
alone. Someone with a working-class background who gets into an elite university has also figured
out, developed, or acquired a certain amount of resources and skills to get there. See DiMaggio &
Mohr, supra note 131, at 1246 (citing PIERRE BOURDIEU & JEAN-CLAUDE PASSERON,
REPRODUCTION IN EDUCATION, SOCIETY AND CULTURE 54-68 (Richard Nice trans., Sage Publ'n
ed., 1977)). A person's experiences at an elite university, of course, will develop her cultural capital
further. See id at 1248-49.
133. Morrill, supra note 47, at 667; accord Annette Lareau, Invisible Inequality: Social Class
and Childrearing in Black Families and White Families, 67 AM. Soc. REv. 747, 747-48 (2002)
[hereinafter Lareau, Invisible Inequality]; MERRY, supra note 70, at 54.
134. See infra Appendix, at Table 1.
135. See infra Appendix, at Table 2.
136. See infra Appendix, at Table 2.
464 [VOL. 66: 445
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol66/iss2/4
2014] FACT AND FICTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
controlling for the same demographic characteristics included in the first
model.137
Consistent with the patterns suggested in Table 1, few differences in
people's knowledge of rights were based on demographic characteristics.'
38 As
shown in Table 2, Model 1, race, parents' education, citizenship, age, and prior
search or arrest did not correlate significantly with respondents' performance on
the rights knowledge inventory.'39
Perhaps surprisingly, gender's effect was significant.40 Women were less
likely to know their rights than men were, a finding which did not change with
the inclusion of parents' education in Model 2.141 Two interaction effects were
also present: one between sample and gender, and the other between sample and
Hispanic.14 2 While the main effect of being female was negative, the interaction
between sample and female was positive. 43 In other words, for community
college students, being female was associated with lower rights knowledge
scores, but for university students, being female was associated with higher
rights knowledge scores. Also, although being Hispanic resulted in lower rights
knowledge scores for university students, it had no significant effect for
community college students.14 We found no other significant main or
interaction effects between the remaining demographic variables and rights
knowledge.
Table 2, Model 2 shows the effect of parents' education on rights
knowledge, controlling for the same variables included in Table 2, Model 1.146
Parents' education was not significant, nor was its interaction, and it did little to
change the direction, significance, or magnitude of the other coefficients.147 The
effects of gender, as well as the interaction effects described above, remained
significant. 48 We found no other significant main or interaction effects.
C. Rights Assertion
Recall that Table 1 showed that being a university student, compared to
being a community college student, was associated with a greater willingness to
137. See infra Appendix, at Table 2.
138. Compare infra Appendix, at Table 1, with infra Appendix, at Table 2 (depicting that
demographic characteristics hardly affect rights knowledge).
139. See infra Appendix, at Table 2.
140. See infra Appendix, at Table 2 (t= -1.71, p<.10).
141. See infra Appendix, at Table 2.
142. See infra Appendix, at Table 2.
143. See infra Appendix, at Table 2 (t = -2.45, p < .05).
144. See infra Appendix, at Table 2 (t = -1.24, p <.05).
145. See infra Appendix, at Table 2.
146. See infra Appendix, at Table 2.
147. See infra Appendix, at Table 2.
148. See infra Appendix, at Table 2.
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assert one's rights in response to all five vignettes.14 9  Table 3, which
corresponds to Model 1 in Table 2, shows that this relationship largely held true
net of gender, age, citizenship, race, rights knowledge, and previous arrests.150
As Table 3 shows, across Vignettes 1, 2, 3, and 4, the relationship between
being in the university sample and rights assertion was both significant and
positive.15 1 That is, presence in the university sample increased a respondent's
likelihood of indicating that she would assert her rights: refusing to let a police
officer search her home (p > .01), asserting her right to silence in response to
police questions (p < .01), and refusing to let the police search her car (p < .01)
or her bag (p < .05).152 For university students compared to community college
students, the odds of refusing to allow the police to search her home were 2.04 to
I (about twice as likely), the odds of refusing to answer police questions were
2.93 to I (nearly three times greater),154 the odds of allowin one's car to be
searched were 3.62 to I (approximately 3.5 times greater), and the odds of
allowing one's bag to be searched were 1.76 to 1, (1.76 times greater).15 6
A handful of other variables in Table 3 were sporadically significant with
regard to rights assertion. Non-citizen respondents were significantly less likely
to refuse to a warrantless search of their home, as compared to citizens.157 But in
Vignette 2, which dealt with respondents' willingness to talk to the police about
a work-related investigation,58 the opposite effect occurred: non-citizens were
significantly more likely to assert their right not to speak to police.59
In the first vignette (the home search), there was a significant interaction
between membership in the university sample and Hispanic ethnicity; Hispanic
respondents were more likely to report they would allow the police to search
their home, but that was only true for Hispanic respondents in the university
sample (p < .05).160
149. Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data, at Questions 1-5 (on file with
authors); see infra Appendix, at Table 1.
150. See infra Appendix, at Tables 2 & 3. We calculated Chronbach's alpha for the five
vignettes, as well as various combinations of three and four vignettes. See Kathryne M. Young &
Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data, at Questions 1-5 (on file with authors). Values ranged from .29 to
.42, indicating that a rights assertion scale based on these vignettes (i.e., adding up the number of
"assertion" answers versus non-assertion answers) would be unreliable. Id Thus, we analyzed each
vignette separately, as shown in Tables 3 and 4. See infra Appendix, at Tables 3 & 4.
151. See infra Appendix, at Table 3.
152. See infra Appendix, at Table 3.
153. See infra Appendix, at Table 3.
154. See infra Appendix, at Table 3 (exp[l.075]= 2.93).
155. See infra Appendix, at Table 3 (exp[L.285]= 3.62).
156. See infra Appendix, at Table 3 (exp[0.570] = 1.76).
157. See infra Appendix, at Table 3 (exp[-1.013] = .36). To be exact, they were 64% less
likely to refuse to a warrantless search of their home. Id.
158. See infra Appendix, at Table 3.
159. See infra Appendix, at Table 3.
160. See infra Appendix, at Table 3.
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Age was significantly related to rights assertion for Vignettes 2 and 5,161
which were the two questions that dealt with speaking to the police, as opposed
to agreeing to a search. Older people were significantly more likely to believe
that they would assert their right to remain silent (Vignette 2; p < .10),162 as well
as their right to ask for a lawyer before answering police questions (Vignette 5 ; p
<. 05).163
Finally, in Vignette 4, women were significantly less likely to refuse a
search of their bag (p < .05).16 Women were about 46% less likely, compared
to men, to assert their rights in this vignette (exp[-. 608] = .54).165
Table 4 employs Model 2, introducing parents' education.1 As we
suggested above, we used these two models to separate the effects of the two
variables-that is, if university attendance matters, does it matter simply because
of the differences in respondents' parents' education and correspondent disparate
amounts of resources available, or is there an effect beyond this? We modeled
the effect of having at least one parent or guardian with a college degree, and its
interaction with which sample respondent was from, where significant, net of the
demographic characteristics modeled in Table 3.168 Table 4 presents the logistic
regression coefficients for these models.169
In Vignette 1, the addition of the parents' education variable, though not
itself significant, reduced the significance and magnitude of the university
coefficient, suggesting that university students' greater willingness to refuse a
warrantless home search may be due to their more privileged backgrounds.170
The parents' education variable was not significant in Vignette 2, either, and
its addition had little effect on the significance or magnitude of the university
variable, suggesting that-to the extent that parents' education is an effective
proxy for social class-some other factor related to status was in operation.171
In Vignette 3, parents' education was positive and significant (p < .01).
Respondents who had at least one parent or guardian with a four-year college
degree were approximately 2.5 times more likely to assert their rights in this
161. Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data, at Questions 2 & 5 (on file with
authors); see infra Appendix, at Table 3.
162. Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data, at Question 2 (on file with
authors); see infra Appendix, at Table 3.
163. Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data, at Question 5 (on file with
authors); see infra Appendix, at Table 3.
164. Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data, at Question 4 (on file with
authors); see infra Appendix, at Table 3.
165. See infra Appendix, at Table 3.
166. See infra Appendix, at Tables 2 & 4.
167. See infra Appendix, at Table 2.
168. See infra Appendix, at Table 3.
169. See infra Appendix, at Tables 2 & 4.
170. See infra Appendix, at Table 4.
171. See infra Appendix, at Table 4.
172. See infra Appendix, at Table 4.
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vignette than students who did not.'7 Note, however, that the effect of
membership in the university sample remained positive and significant-
suggesting that differences in rights assertion between the two samples were not
due to the underlying disparity in parental education.174
In Vignette 4, parents' education was not significant, but this variable's
addition reduced the significance and magnitude of the coefficient that
corresponded with membership in the university sample.17 5 Whereas in Table 3,
the odds of refusing a search of one's bag were 1.76 to 1 (p < .05) (with
university students more likely than community college students to refuse), after
accounting for parents' education, the odds became 1.20 to I (p < .10).176 Thus,
university students may be more likely to assert their right to refuse a search of
their bag because of their more privileged background, as measured by parents'
education.177
Finally, in Vignette 5, there was a significant main effect and a significant
interaction effect for parents' education. Specifically, for community college
students, the effect of having at least one parent or guardian with a four-year
degree was negatively associated with rights assertion, but for university
students, the effect of having at least one parent or guardian with a four-year
degree was positively associated with rights assertion.17 9  The inclusion of
parents' education resulted in few shifts of significance elsewhere in the model,
none of which carried across multiple vignettes.'80
D. Reasons for Compliance or Assertion
As mentioned above, respondents were asked to explain their reasons for
rights assertion or compliance in an open-ended written response. After
indicating whether they would assert their rights or comply with the police's
request, each participant was asked the open-ended question, "Why or why
not?"'8 ' We included this in order to see whether respondents' reasoning about
rights assertion differed between the two samples.
173. See infra Appendix, at Table 4 (exp [0.952] = 2.59).
174. See infra Appendix, at Table 4.
175. See infra Appendix, at Table 3.
176. See infra Appendix, at Table 4.
177. See infra Appendix, at Table 4.
178. See infra Appendix, at Table 4.
179. See infra Appendix, at Table 4.
180. See infra Appendix, at Table 4. It is, perhaps, worth noting a few instances of marginal
significance: in Vignette 1, black racial identity and membership in the university sample (p = .1]
in both cases), and in Vignettes 2 and 3, non-citizenship (p = .11 and p = .12, respectively).
Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data, at Questions 1-3 (on file with authors);
see infra Appendix, at Table 4.
181. Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data, at Questions 1-5 (on file with
authors).
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We extracted the written responses to each vignette. We then employed an
open coding system, using a modified grounded theory approach, and coded the
data by hand. Consistent with this approach, we created no predetermined codes
in advance of the coding process.'82  A few response patterns emerged
prominently for each vignette. Some patterns emerged in multiple vignettes.
We then created a new variable for each theme-and-vignette combination. Each
respondent was assigned a "1" if he mentioned a particular theme in his open-
ended answer to the vignette and a "0" if he did not. This is similar to the
procedure followed by Rogers et al. in categorizing open-ended responses in
order to understand people's misconceptions about the Miranda warnings.184
In order to ensure that differences between the two groups were not due to
variations in the length of the explanations written, we calculated the average
number of words used by the members of each sample in response to each
vignette; no significant differences existed. ss For three questions, the
community college students wrote slightly more on average; for the remaining
two questions, the private college students wrote slightly more on average.186
Overall, the average amount written in response to each vignette by each group
was nearly identical, with community college respondents writing an average of
14.8 words of explanation per vignette and university respondents writing an
average of 14.6 words of explanation per vignette.187  While it is still
theoretically possible that one sample was more effective in crafting
explanations than the other, this did not appear to be the case.
We conducted chi-square tests' to examine the most popular themes in
order to see if there were significant differences between the university and
community college respondents. Here, we report only the findings of theoretical
interest.
182. See id.
183. See id. In the authors' opinion, constructing quantitative variables from qualitative
responses should only be done in limited situations. Coding open-ended field notes to create
quantitative measures, for example, is not especially reliable, because there is a virtually unlimited
field of data, and the researcher essentially generates the n. The authors were willing to construct
variables from open-ended responses here, however, since the field comprised responses to specific
survey questions. Additionally, the quantitative categories themselves were not imposed but
generated from the data via an open-ended coding scheme. An alternative would have been to
choose reasons ahead of time and have respondents rank or choose among them. While this
approach has the advantage of neatness, it would have had the rather large disadvantage of imposing
our suppositions about people's assertions or non-assertions as the possible responses, rather than
allowing respondents' own reasoning to drive their answers. In a future project, when more is
known about rights reasoning, the multiple-choice approach may make sense. However, at this
stage, the authors opted for a more expansive approach.
184. Rogers, Implicit Assumptions, supra note 30, at 303.






Young and Munsch: Fact and Fiction in Constitutional Criminal Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In response to Vignette 1, most respondents indicated that they would assert
their right to refuse a search of their home (n = 273; 76.9%).189 Thematically,
answers to this question were all over the board, and almost no variation existed
between the two populations.190 But one small theme among those who said that
they would refuse the search was suspicion that the officer was not a real police
officer and might be posing as one to gain entry (n = 11).191 Of the II
respondents who cited this suspicion as a reason for refusal, all were from the
community college sample; none were from the university sample-a
statistically significant difference.1 92
The most popular theme among respondents who indicated in response to
Vignette 2 (being questioned about a possible workplace crime) that they would
exercise their right to remain silent (n = 164) was risk aversion.1 93 We define
this variety of explanation as non-compliance for a reason related to a desire to
exercise caution and be on the "safe side"-for example, to await further
information even if they knew that they, themselves, had done nothing wrong (n
= 85).194 A chi-square test of independence showed that the proportion of
respondents from the university sample who cited risk aversion as a reason for
remaining silent (.69) was significantly greater than the proportion of community
college students who cited risk aversion as their reason for remaining silent
(.41). 195
One additional theme in the answers to Vignette 2 was a desire to help the
police (n = 26).196 The proportion of university respondents who explained their
compliance in terms of wanting to help the police (.27) was significantly greater
than the proportion of community college respondents who explained their
compliance in the same terms (.10).197
In respondents' answers to Vignette 3 (the car search scenario), one theme
among compliant respondents' (n = 118) answers was the inevitability of a
search.198 That is, a respondent said she would acquiesce to the search because
even if she did not, the police would search the car anyway (n = 24).199 None of
the 16 compliant university respondents expressed concern that the search was
189. Id. at Question 1.
190. Id.
191. Id
192. Id (X 2 (1, n = 273) = 5.64, p < .05). Because the expected cell values were relatively
small, we ran a Fisher's exact test to check the validity of the chi-square value. The result was
nearly identical,p <.05.
193. Id at Question 2.
194. Id.
195. Id. (X 2 (1, n = 164) = 12.04, p < .001). Risk aversion also emerged as a theme in the
responses to Vignette 5, but in that instance, the difference between the two groups of respondents
was not significant. Id. at Question 5.
196. Id at Question 2.
197. Id (e (1, n = 1 8 3) = 6 .9 1, p < .01).
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inevitable, but 24 of the 102 community college respondents who said that they
would consent to a search said they would do so because the search was
inevitable.200 As the proportions suggest, this difference between the two
populations of respondents is significant. Inevitability also arose as a theme in
the answers to Vignette 4 (search of respondent's bag during a bus trip); eight
respondents mentioned inevitability in their open-ended responses to the
scenario.202 Just as in the Vignette 3 answers, all respondents who mentioned
inevitability came from the community college sample. 03 The numbers hint at a
pattern, though the statistical significance is marginal.204
In Vignette 5, respondents were asked to imagine that an officer knocked on
their door and told them that the police were investigating a recent robbery.205 A
police officer wanted to question the respondent because the same kind of car the
respondent owned had been seen driving from the scene.206 Respondents were
then asked, "Do you ask for a lawyer before answering their questions?"207
Among those who complied-did not ask for a lawyer (n = 191)-the most
popular rationale given was that they had nothing to hide (n = 96).208 The
proportion of community college students (.54; 75 of 140) who said that they
complied because they had nothing to hide was greater than the proportion of
compliant university students who gave the same rationale (.41; 21 of 51).209 A
chi-square test yields a p-value of .13,21o which suggests a trend, but does not
amount to statistical significance.
A second theme that emerged in Vignette 5 among those who complied was
that they wanted to avoid looking guilty (n = 20). 1 A chi-square test of
independence showed that the proportion of community college students who
explained that they would comply so as not to appear guilty was significantly
200. Id.
201. See id (X 2 (1, n = 118) = 4.73, p < .05). Because the expected cell values were relatively
small in this case, we ran a Fisher's exact test to check the validity of the chi-square value. The
result was very similar, with a slightly higher p-value, but still p < .05. Id.
202. Id. at Question 4. Unlike the answers to Vignette 3, however, inevitability was given by
respondents irrespective of whether they indicated that they would allow the search. Id at Question
3. For this reason, we calculated the difference between the samples using all respondents (n
367), regardless of yes-or-no response to Vignette 4. Id at Question 4.
203. Id. at Questions 3 & 4.
204. Id (e (1, n = 367) = 3.39, p < .1). However, given the expected cell size in this
calculation, a Fisher's exact test is a more reliable measure and suggests marginal significance (p =
.11).




209. See infra Appendix, at Table 1.
210. Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data, at Question 5 (on file with
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smaller than the proportion of university students who explained their
compliance in these terms.2 12
V. DISCUSSION
A. Rights Knowledge
Dissenting in Schneckloth v. Bustamante2 13 forty years ago, Justice Brennan
wrote, "It wholly escapes me how our citizens can meaningfully be said to have
waived something as precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever being
aware of its existence."214 Our findings suggest that expecting people to know
how their rights apply in a particular encounter with police is unrealistic.
Moreover, the assumption that in most situations citizens do know their rights is
incorrect.2 15
As shown in Table 2, the only significant correlate with rights knowledge
was gender; women's scores on the rights knowledge quiz was significantly
lower than men's scores, on average.216 This may be because men have more
exposure to the criminal justice system and are more likely to be arrested,217 and
thus have more need to know their rights. However, if this were true,
respondents who identified as black or African-American, and perhaps also those
who identified as Hispanic or Latino, should have received significantly higher
scores as well, since men in these racial groups are disproportionately subjects of
police investigation218-which was not the case.2 19 Nor is it evident why being
female is associated with lower rights knowledge scores for community college
students, but higher rights knowledge scores for university students.220 Perhaps
these findings are statistical noise, but they suggest a potential area for future
research.
For the most part, though, as Table 2 shows, we found almost no correlation
between rights knowledge and the demographic variables of interest.221 While a
ten-question quiz is not a comprehensive assessment of people's knowledge of
212. Id (X(1,n= 182)=2.63,p<.1 (p=.051)).
213. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
214. Id. at 277 (Brennan J., dissenting).
215. See Rogers, Implicit Assumptions, supra note 30, at 317.
216. See infra Appendix, at Table 2.
217. See William A. DeVan, Toward a New Standard in Gender Discrimination: The Case of
Virginia Military Institute, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 489, 506 (1992) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 201 (1976)).
218. See Christopher L. Griffin, Jr. et al., Corrections for Racial Disparities in Law
Enforcement, 55 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1365, 1382 (2014).
219. In fact, being Hispanic actually results in lower rights knowledge scores, though only for
respondents from the university sample. See infra Appendix, at Table 1.
220. See infra Appendix, at Table 1.
221. See infra Appendix, at Table 2.
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their Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights, it nonetheless indicates a
pattern that accords with the handful of other studies that have looked at the
relationship between status characteristics and rights knowledge.222 A top-shelf
education does not appear to correlate with greater rights knowledge, nor even
does prior experience being searched or arrested by police.223
This finding might be encouraging-since members of privileged groups do
not have greater access to knowledge of their rights than members of non-
privileged groups224-were it not for dismal overall scores.225 People tended to
score worse than chance, suggesting that not only do people not know about their
rights, but they also hold misconceptions that lead them to incorrect
226conclusions. As the first author has elaborated upon elsewhere, the
knowledge people do have appears to lead them astray. Understandably
oblivious to the law's myriad exceptions and caveats, they often assume that
general constitutional principles apply more broadly than they actually do.228
Rogers identified a similar dynamic with regard to the Miranda warnings.2 29 His
work supports the conclusion that the small amount of information
communicated by the warnings may lead people to draw incorrect conclusions
about the warnings' meaning.230 Our results suggest that people are led astray
231with or without the Miranda warnings. There appears to be plenty of
misinformation, or perhaps just insufficiently specific information, circulating
about many areas of constitutional criminal procedure.232
In one sense, these findings are unsurprising. After all, even someone who
had a copy of the Constitution in front of him during an encounter with the
police would probably find it unhelpful. The Constitution's text does not specify
when you get the "[a]ssistance of Counsel for [your] defence"233 or which
234searches are "unreasonable" ones. Even if it makes sense to assume that
citizens know the Bill of Rights and the Miranda warnings by heart, it does not
make sense to assume that they pore over criminal procedure hornbooks in their
222. See, e.g., Rogers, Implicit Assumptions, supra note 30, at 312-13 (finding that rights
knowledge does not correlate significantly with education).
223. Id. at 314.
224. Id. at 312, tbl.2.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 311 (discussing common misconceptions by defendants about the applicability
of their Miranda rights).
227. See Young, supra note 23, at 71.
228. Id.
229. See Rogers, Implicit Assumptions, supra note 30, at 307.
230. See id at 316.
231. See infra Appendix, at Table 2.
232. See Rogers, Implicit Assumptions, supra note 30, at 316. This, of course, prompts the
question: are warnings are an effective means of communicating peoples' rights to them? We
briefly take up the inquiry later in this Article.
233. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
234. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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spare time. And increasingly, the Court seems to expect nothing less. In
Salinas, after all, the majority opinion did not even engage with the idea that to
assert his Fifth Amendment right to silence, Salinas would have had to enter the
encounter knowing a surprising amount of information.235 Specifically, to use
his Fifth Amendment right as the Court suggests, he would have had to know
that he (1) had a right to silence236 (2) which did not technically apply yet, since
(3) he was not in custody and was technically "free to leave" (even though he
was at a police station answering increasingly pointed questions),237 so (4) to
assert his right to silence, he had to tell police something along the lines of, "I
am asserting my Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate myself,"238 and then
(5) had to remain silent to avoid re-initiating contact with the police.239
Expecting people to simply "know their rights" in situations like Salinas's
bespeaks either naive idealism or hostility to the prospect of people actually
using their rights. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that many police
investigations must be built on the backs of people's entirely understandable
ignorance of how their rights work in practice.
B. Rights Assertion and Reasons for Compliance or Assertion
People usually think of rights knowledge as a prerequisite to assertion.240
Indeed, as explained above, this is why we included rights information within
each vignette-to test a respondent's willingness to assert a right regardless of
his preexisting awareness of it.241 A person with greater general rights
knowledge would, we might expect, have a greater sense of his own agency or
self-efficacy during interactions with the police. Consequently, we might expect
that this greater sense of agency or self-efficacy would lead him to assert his
rights more readily in general. However, this did not bear out. As the row
labeled "Total Correct" in Tables 3 and 4 shows, a general knowledge of rights
(as measured by the rights knowledge test) had little or no correlation with a
242willingness to assert rights in the five scenarios presented. The only two times
a correlation was present, it was not only marginally significant, but cut in the
opposite direction from what agency-via-knowledge would predict.243 In both of
those cases, greater rights knowledge was actually associated with less
235. See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2182-83.
236. Id at 2178.
237. Id. at 2178, 2180.
238. Id
239. Contra id at 2178.
240. See supra Part I.
241. See supra Part II.A-B.
242. See infra Appendix, at Tables 3 & 4.
243. See infra Appendix, at Table 4 (row = Total Correct; columns = Q3; Q5).
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willingness to assert rights.244 This result was consistent with Kessler's study,
though Kessler looked at the effect of knowing a particular right,245 whereas our
vignettes included an internal "control" for knowledge of the right in question,
246instead examining the effect of rights knowledge in general. In neither case,
though, does knowledge appear to translate into a willingness to assert one's
rights.
Given the salience of race in the criminal justice system, we also expected
that race, particularly black or African-American identity, would figure
prominently. Instead, we-found no connection between a person's race and her
247willingness to assert her rights2. Of course, this does not mean that race is not
a salient characteristic in police-citizen interactions; on the contrary, a vast
amount of research has demonstrated that race is extremely salient.248  But
interestingly, in testing rights assertion, we detected no racial effect.249 And in
the open-ended responses to Vignettes I through 5, mentions of race were
exceedingly rare;25  race only showed up explicitly in the answers of one
respondent, a man from the university sample who explained that he strategically
drops hints about his high social status so that the police will not bother him
simply because he is a black man.25 1
It is also possible that race is hugely relevant, but that it cuts in different
directions for different people-for example, making some black men reluctant
to assert their rights and other black men eager to assert their rights. But
assuming that the willingness to assert rights does not vary based on race, these
data point to another reason to pay special attention to the role of race in criminal
investigations. Despite their equal willingness to assert their rights, and despite
their equal knowledge of their rights, a hugely disproportionate number of
minority citizens, particularly black men, are subject to police searches.252 This
244. See id (row = Total Correct; columns = Q3; Q5). Of course, other explanations for this
phenomenon are possible. For example, perhaps people with a typical "law-and-order" attitude are
both more likely to know their rights and more inclined to comply with police requests.
245. See Kessler, supra note 19, at 53.
246. See discussion supra Part Il.A and note 93.
247. See infra Appendix, at Tables 1-4.
248. See, e.g., Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Race and Perceptions of Police Misconduct,
51 Soc. PROBLEMS 305, 305 (2004) (noting that "race is one of the most salient predictors of
attitudes toward the police and other criminal justice institutions").
249. See infra Appendix, at Tables 1-4.
250. Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data (on file with authors).
251. See id To be clear, we are not arguing that race was not on respondents' minds when
they were deciding whether to assert a right; we are merely observing that race made almost no
explicit appearance in respondents' explanations. The absence of race in the explanations could also
simply indicate that people felt uncomfortable bringing up race in this context.
252. See, e.g., Mike Bostock & Ford Fessenden, 'Stop-and-Frisk' Is All but Gone From New
York, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/19/nyregion/stop-
and-frisk-is-all-but-gone-from-new-york.html?_r-0 (mapping police stops in New York by race).
475
31
Young and Munsch: Fact and Fiction in Constitutional Criminal Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
at least suggests the possibility that even when certain groups do assert their
253
rights, the police do not respect these assertions.
Prior search or arrest by the police also seems to have no effect on a person's
willingness to assert her rights. Though this may seem surprising at first, it
will shock few criminal defense practitioners, who are well-acquainted with the
phenomenon of having a newly-released client swear he will not speak to the
police again without a lawyer present, only to immediately speak to the police
the next time he is arrested.25 5 This is consistent with risk-preferring behavior;
some people tend to think they can talk themselves out of trouble, despite ample
precedent to the contrary.2 56 We discuss the relationship between risk aversion
and rights assertion infra.
Indicia of status and social class appear to be the factors most highly
correlated with a willingness to assert rights.257 Recall that we followed other
researchers' lead,258 using parents' education as a proxy for social class.259
Additionally, we used the type of college attended as an indicator of "status" or
cultural capital. Using two separate measures allowed us to look at social class
and cultural capital (somewhat) separately. Though these ideas are closely
related, and though there is certainly a relationship between them, they are not
identical.260
As Table 3 shows, presence in the university sample versus the community
college sample correlated with rights assertion for four of the five vignettes.2
Moreover, in all four cases, the correlation was positive, suggesting that
respondents from the university sample were significantly more likely to assert
262their rights than respondents from the community college sample. In Table 4,
we introduced parents' education.263 If university attendance versus community
college attendance was functioning solely as a proxy for social class in Table
253. Sandefur has observed that research "tells us much about what kinds of experiences
people believe to be fair but rather less about which groups are more or less likely to encounter fair-
feeling experiences." Sandefur, Civil Justice, supra note 72, at 341.
254. See Rogers, Implicit Assumptions, supra note 30, at 315 & n.4.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 315.
257. See infra Appendix, at Table 4; see also supra text accompanying note 177 (noting that
results suggest a "more privileged background" may result in a greater willingness to assert rights).
258. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
259. Obviously, parents' education is not a perfect proxy for social class. After all, it treats a
respondent with two parents who hold Ph.Ds. from Harvard identically to someone raised by a
single parent with a four-year degree.
260. See, e.g., Annette Lareau, Social Class Differences in Family-School Relationships: The
Importance of Cultural Capital, 60 SOc. EDUC. 73, 83-84 (1987) [hereinafter Lareau, Social Class]
(stating that "[social c]lass provides social and cultural resources, but these resources must be
invested or activated to become a form of cultural capital").
261. See infra Appendix, at Table 3.
262. See id.
263. See infra Appendix, at Table 4.
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3,264 we would expect that effect to be largely erased by the inclusion of parents'
26526education in Table 4. However, this did not occur. University respondents
remained significantly more likely than community college respondents to assert
a right in more than half the vignettes-three out of five.267 At the same time,
parents' education was also significant in two instances. In response to Vignette
3, having one parent with a college degree is positively correlated to a
respondent's willingness to assert her rights, regardless of which sample she was
from.268 In response to Vignette 5, having one parent with a college degree was
positively correlated to the willingness to assert rights, though only for
respondents from the university sample.269
Given the work of Michele Gilman, John Gilliom, Christopher Slobogin,
and others, perhaps it is not surprising that factors like class, social status, and
cultural capital correlate positively with a willingness to assert rights.270 This
may be due in part to a greater sense of entitlement among privileged
individuals. Taken together, our findings provide preliminary support for the
idea that in general, social class and cultural capital may be powerful predictors
of a person's willingness to assert her rights, and that this effect may be largely
independent of other demographic factors.271 The only other variable that
correlated significantly with responses to more than one vignette was age, with
older respondents more likely to express willingness to assert a right-consistent
272with Kessler's finding as well. This makes sense, assuming rights assertion is
correlated with a sense of personal agency, since increased age is associated with
273a greater sense of emotional control over one's life, as well as decreased
distress in situations involving interpersonal conflict.274 Older adults may make
calmer, less fear-based decisions about rights assertion.275
264. See infra Appendix, at Table 3.
265. See infra Appendix, at Table 4.
266. See infra Appendix, at Table 3.
267. See infra Appendix, at Table 4.
268. See infra Appendix, at Tables 3 & 4.
269. See infra Appendix, at Table 4. For respondents from the community college sample,
parents' education actually cuts in the opposite direction. Id
270. See generally Gilman, supra note 89, at 1390 (arguing that "[t]he law reinforces [a] class
differential in privacy"); GILLIOM, supra note 70, at 70-71 (explaining that many impoverished
people have been forced to waive various aspects of their privacy in order to receive aid); Slobogin,
supra note 86, at 391 (detailing the relationship between poverty and the Fourth Amendment's
application).
271. See infra Appendix, at Tables 1-4.
272. See infra Appendix, at Table 4; Kessler, supra note 19, at 76 & tbl.3.
273. James J. Gross et al., Emotion and Aging: Experience, Expression, and Control, 12
PSYCHOL. & AGING 590, 592 (1997).
274. Susan T. Charles & Laura L. Carstensen, Unpleasant Situations Elicit Different
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Though it has never been examined in the instant context, other work sheds
light on the mechanisms through which social class and cultural capital may
276affect rights consciousness. One reason for this is that government oversight
is a staple for many people in lower income brackets.27 7 As Gilliom argues,
people subject to such oversight tend to view legal authorities as possessing a
great deal of discretion over them, both formally and informally.27 They may
be more accustomed to seeing themselves as subjects of authority, and may
consequently experience a lesser sense of personal agency and self-efficacy in
police-citizen interactions.279 The open-ended responses to our vignettes support
this interpretation. In response to two of the three vignettes related to search and
seizure (Vignettes 3 and 4), some respondents mentioned inevitability in their
justification; these respondents said that no matter what they did, the police
would search their property anyway.280 Here are a few representative samples:
* "If you say no, that [sic] 'probable cause' under
suspicion of the officer. So, my best chance of
minimal damage, is to tell the truth."281
* "There [sic] going to do it anyway."282
* "But more likely they will insist with the search and
flip things around by saing Im [sic] a danger to the
people on the bus . . .2
* "Usually officers don't take no for an answer."284
Responses citing inevitability only came from community college
respondents-the group with less cultural capital.2 85 Lower cultural capital may
create the feeling that refusing an authority figure's request is unwise or futile.2
In contrast, high-status individuals with more cultural capital may relate to
authorities very differently, viewing themselves as (at minimum) social equals to
a police officer, and viewing their individual rights as more central to the
276. See GILLIOM, supra note 70, at 70-71.
277. See generally GILLIOM, supra note 70, at 19 (explaining that "governments have [always]
closely examined those who seek assistance").
278. GILLIOM, supra note 70, at 71.
279. Young, supra note 23, at 85.
280. See Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data, at Questions 3 & 4 (on file
with authors).
281. Id. at Question 3.
282. Id
283. Id at Question 4.
284. Id
285. See id. at Question 3; Lareau, Social Class, supra note 260, at 82 (citing Pierre Bourdieu,
Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction, in POWER AND IDEOLOGY IN EDUCATION 487, 488
(Jerome Karabel & A.H. Halsey eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1977); BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supra
note 132, at 54-68).
286. See Young, supra note 23, at 85.
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287
encounter. And since they are presumably accustomed to receiving respect
from authority figures, it may simp21' not occur to them that an officer would
disregard their assertion of a right. 2 It is telling that none of the university
respondents mentioned thinking that the police would conduct a search even if
they attempted to assert their Fourth Amendment rights.289
Annette Lareau's research about the relationship between social class and
individual interaction styles sheds some light on this process.290 Observing
upper-middle-class parents' and working class parents' interactions with their
children, Lareau concludes that the former are socialized to develop an
"emerging sense of entitlement" that includes interacting with authorities as
equals and questioning unsatisfactory treatment.291 She argues that working-
class children, on the other hand, are taught to defer to authorities and avoid
292
protesting against unfair circumstances and negative outcomes2. Given that
"police are such an acme incarnation of authority,"293 this dynamic might be
especially relevant to police-citizen interactions. "Lower-status individuals may
be more likely to view police as occupying a higher status position than
themselves," while higher status individuals might see police as equivalent, or
even inferior, to their own social position.294 Additionally, high-status
individuals may assume-perhaps even subconsciously-that if an investigatory
encounter "goes wrong," they will have the resources to remedy the situation.295
It is not simply that a privileged person thinks, "If the police do not listen to me,
I will call my mother, a wealthy CEO who has the power to remedy the
injustice," but that his entire orientation to law is different as a result of the
experiences and attitudes from which his legal consciousness has been
constructed over a lifetime. A person's willingness to employ the law, at least in
the civil context, is closely related to how she understands law and legality more
generally.296 Our social location and our experienceS297 "creat[e] dispositions
that come to colour future behaviour," powerfully shaping how we understand
and relate to law. 298
287. Id
288. See infra Appendix, at Table 4; Young, supra note 23, at 85.
289. See infra Appendix, at Table 1; Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data
(on file with authors).
290. Young, supra note 23, at 84 (citing Lareau, Invisible Inequality, supra note 133, at 749)
(explaining that social class and childrearing play a part in interactions with authority figures).
291. Id at 84-85 (quoting Lareau, Invisible Inequality, supra note 133, at 749).
292. Id (citing Lareau, Invisible Inequality, supra note 133, at 773).
293. Id. at 85.
294. Id.
295. Id
296. MERRY, supra note 70, at 37.
297. See Nielsen, supra note 65, at 1056.
298. Sandefur, The Importance ofDoing Nothing, supra note 72, at 127; see Engel & Munger,
supra note 47, at 10.
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The differences in respondents' open-ended answers to the rights assertion
vignettes also suggest disparate approaches to risk.299 The proportion of
university respondents who mentioned risk aversion as a reason for asserting
their rights was significantly higher than the proportion of community college
respondents whose answers demonstrated risk-averse reasoning.300 University
respondents' risk-averse reasoning included the following:
* I may be coerced into implicating myself-I don't
trust the police to be straight forward [sic] with me.301
* I would want a lawyer present to act as a buffer,
regardless of the fact that I hadn't done anything
wrong.302
* The police could use interrogation to procure a faulty
response/incriminating reply. 3
* B/c I'm innocent and don't want to slip out of
anxiety.304
* Unless I am 100% familiar w/ all the laws regarding
the industry, I wouldn't feel comfortable (afraid to
self-incriminate unknowingly).30 s
In contrast, the community college respondents tended to give reasons that
were apparently unrelated to risk aversion:
* Because I have rights and I don't like being
investigated.306
* If I'm 100% percent innocent, the matter does not
regard me, or my self-interests.307
* I would wait until my lawyer is present. This is my
right. "I have the right to remain silent."308
* 1 will remain si[le]nt and use my rights which are
given to me by the constitution because if I have not
299. See infra Appendix, at Tables 3 & 4; see also supra note 183 and accompanying text.
300. See infra Appendix, at Table 1; Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data,
at Questions 1-5 (on file with authors).





306. Id at Question 2.
307. Id
308. Id
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committed any wrong dueing [sic] I should not have to
comply.309
It is possible that the community college respondents were motivated by risk
aversion and simply did not articulate it, but given that the length of their
responses did not differ from the university respondents' and that their reasoning
was not generally "simpler," 3 10 this seems unlikely. Note, too, that the university
respondents did not express more affinity for police, or more trust in authority,
than the community college respondents did.3' But a lack of trust in the police
may manifest as inevitability (resulting in consent and compliance) among
lower-status individuals, and as risk aversion (resulting in assertion and
noncompliance) in the case of higher-status individuals. 3 12
A pattern of risk aversion also emerged in the responses to Vignette 5, this
time among those who said they would not assert their rights. 3 13  University
respondents were significantly more likely than community college respondents
to say that they would comply with the police so as not to give off the impression
that they were guilty.314  This is similar to risk aversion; in both cases, the
university respondents are figuring out how to "play it safe" with authority.315
Some representative responses included:
* My cooperation shows I have nothing to hide.3 16
* Because it seems suspicious if you ask for a lawyer.
* By answering the questions voluntarily I show I have
nothing to hide plus, I can stop answering whenever I
want to, I have control.
Even when individuals with high social status com~l with the police, they
tend to express a sense of agency over their situation. They have multiple
strategies for this; they may try to put themselves in the position of the officer,
309. Id.
310. See infra Appendix, at Table 1; Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data
(on file with authors).
311. See infra Appendix, at Table 1; Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data
(on file with authors).
312. See Young, supra note 23, at 85.
313. Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data, at Question 5 (on file with
authors).
314. See infra Appendix, at Table 1; Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data,
at Question 5 (on file with authors).
315. See infra Appendix A, at Table 1; Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey
Data, at Question 5 (on file with authors).
316. Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data (on file with authors).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. See Young, supra note 23, at 85 & n.15.
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they may convey their own status or authority, or they may consciously manage
the image they present to the officer.320 As Lareau and others have suggested, a
crucial part of developing cultural capital is managing relationships with
professionals and authority figures, which includes a significant amount of
impression management.32 Based on the evidence presented in this Article, the
patterns Lareau identifies appear to manifest in the context of criminal procedure
as well. 322
Our results suggest that social class and cultural capital have a significant
effect on which people assert their rights-and thus, on who enters the criminal
justice system in the first place.323 These patterns point to a mechanism that
contributes to the reproduction of social inequality in police-citizen
interactions.324 Moreover, the mechanism is somewhat subtle and largely
invisible, going undetected in large quantitative analyses that use government-
collected data; 25 nonetheless, our results suggest that it that may contribute
326fundamentally to the shape of the criminal justice system.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
A. Law and Policy
Assuming we want people to know what their rights are, and assuming we
want to minimize class-based and other differences in people's willingness or
ability to assert them, we need to think about what kinds of structural changes
would facilitate these outcomes. There are at least two categories of possible
approaches. First, we might increase people's willingness to assert their rights.
Second, we might decrease the importance of rights knowledge and rights
assertion to police investigations more generally. Even better, these approaches
might be combined.
For example, one approach that falls into the first category is to tell people
about a right in any situation when the right becomes relevant. Instead of saying,
"Pop the trunk; I am going to search your car," an officer would have to add
320. See id. at 85.
321. See Lareau, Invisible Inequality, supra note 133, at 773; Lareau, Social Class, supra note
122, at 83-84.
322. See infra Appendix, at Tables 1-4; Young, supra note 23, at 85 (quoting Lareau, Invisible
Inequality, supra note 133, at 749).
323. See infra Appendix, at Tables 1-4.
324. See id.; see also Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Race and Perceptions of Police
Misconduct, 51 SoC. PROBLEMS 305, 305 (2004) (noting that "race is one of the most salient
predictors of attitudes toward the police and other criminal justice institutions").
325. See Rogers, Implicit Assumptions, supra note 30, at 317; Rogers, Knowing and
Intelligent, supra note 30, at 416; Rogers, Language ofMiranda, supra note 30, at 135.
326. See infra Appendix, at Tables 1-4; see also Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch,
Survey Data (on file with authors).
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something like, "And you have the right to refuse this search." A brief warning
in a rights-salient situation would not be terribly onerous for police officers. As
the aftermaths of Miranda v. Arizona327 and Dickerson v. U.S.328 show, police
departments can be nimble in incorporating new constitutional rulings when
necessary.329 Developments in criminal procedure case law are regularly
included in police officers' training,330 and a simple advisement that someone is
free to leave, can refuse a search, or needs to announce that she is invoking her
right to silence would be easy to administer. Nor does it seem likely that
additional warnings would hinder police investigations or conviction rates.331
After all, when Miranda was originally handed down, the decision was hotly
disputed for that very reason-yet, it had virtually no effect on conviction rates,
nor on the likelihood of obtaining confessions from suspects.3 3 2 As we discussed
above, however, the Miranda warnings not necessarily helpful to citizens'
knowledge.3 3 3 The warnings' lack of specificity leads people to misunderstand
their legal rights and make misinformed decisions about whether to speak,
maintain silence, or assert the right to an attorney.334 Nonetheless, the Miranda
warnings' shortcomings are not a problem inherent to warnings.335 Warnings
that were short enough to be practical, simple enough to be comprehensible, and
specific enough to be useful might bring about at least two positive results. For
one, police might be less willing to violate people's rights if they believe citizens
know that they have a right to refuse. For another, it might increase cultural
knowledge and conventional wisdom about rights, spreading rights knowledge,
increasing rights consciousness, and creating a sense of self-efficacy. At the
very least, it is worth investigating whether the benefits of more comprehensive
and specific warnings would outweigh the drawbacks.
Although warnings alone might not increase people's sense of self-efficacy
in encounters with the police, warnings could be combined with other reform
measures to enhance their effectiveness. In-car patrol cameras, small recording
devices, and other technological advances also make it possible that in the not-
too-distant future, all police-citizen encounters could conceivably be taped.
327. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
328. 530 U.S. 428 (2010).
329. Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona: "Embedded"
in Our National Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 207 (2002) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966)).
330. E. J. Hanson, Police Cadet Training, 27 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 568, 571 (1936).
331. See Leo & Thomas, supra note 329, at 237.
332. Leo & Thomas, supra note 329, at 238 (citing James W. Witt, Non-Coercive
Interrogation and the Administration of Criminal Justice: The Impact of Miranda on Police
Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 320, 325 (1973)).
333. See id. at 265.
334. See id.; see also Rogers, Implicit Assumptions, supra note 30, at 307.
335. See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 281 (Hary.
Univ. Press ed., 2008).
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Recording not only has the potential to increase police accountability and allow
judges to review encounters when voluntariness is at issue, but would likely give
citizens a greater sense of agency and self-efficacy.336 If a citizen knew, for
example, that her refusal to allow a search was being recorded, she might feel a
greater sense of agency with regard to her Fourth Amendment rights. Consider
the "inevitability" justifications given by community college respondents, but
not university respondents, for their decision to comply with police requests to
conduct searches. 337  These explanations were rooted in the idea the police
would simply ignore a respondent's rights assertion. But if encounters were
recorded, not only would officers have more incentive to respect rights
assertions, but a citizen who is stopped by police would know that proof would
exist of her assertion or non-assertion. This knowledge might give him a sense
of assurance that would make him feel more entitled to use his rights in
encounters with the police.33 8 This increased self-efficacy may help remedy
class and cultural capital disparities in people's willingness to assert rights.
We might imagine other possible complementary measures as well.
Narrowing the scope of consent searches, for example, would reduce law
enforcement's reliance them and might encourage the development of other
investigatory tools. We might also minimize the importance of rights assertion
through investigatory practices that minimize the chance of coercion. England,
for example, not only mandates that all olice interrogations be taped, but sets
maximum time limits on interrogations3 (which also reduces the likelihood of
false confessions34 0). None of these solutions-body cameras, additional
warnings, mandatory video recording of confessions, time limits on
interrogation, or narrowing the scope of consent searches-is a magic bullet on
its own. But in combination, they may have the potential to reduce the kinds of
inequalities we've described in this Article.
It may be worth thinking, too, about the relationship between people's legal
consciousness and various types of remedies. As Christopher Slobogin has
argued, "The [exclusionary] rule's dominance has probably also led to the
336. Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations,
34 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 3, 26 (2010) (citing William A. Geller, Videotaping Interrogations and
Confessions, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN BRIEF, Mar. 1993, at 6; CHARLES E.
O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 153 (C.C. Thomas ed., 4th ed. 1976)).
337. Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data, at Questions 1, 3-4 (on file
with authors).
338. See Geller, supra note 336, at 7.
339. Christopher Slobogin, Comparative Empiricism and Police Investigative Practices, 37
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 321, 327 (2011) (citing David J. Feldman, England and Wales, in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 149, 167 (Craig Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007)).
340. Kassin, supra note 336, at 25 Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 25 (2010) (citing EDWIN BORCHARD, CONVICTING
THE INNOCENT, SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 370-71 (Yale Univ. Press ed.,
1932)).
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atrophy of alternative remedies, meaning that innocent people have little
recourse . . . [w]ell over half of those who are subject to searches and seizures
outside the home are clean at the time of the search."341 Innocent people know
that, barring a very egregious or abusive violation, they are still powerless if the
police violate their rights.34 2 Practically speaking, then, for many people "rights"
only extend as far as the police are willing to recognize them.343  This
background awareness has a few implications. For one, it gives average, law-
abiding citizens little incentive to think about their rights, because as they see it,
their rights do not make much practical difference to an encounter's outcome.34
Furthermore, as many respondents from both the university and the community
college samples wrote, someone who does not commit any crimes never "needs"
his rights. This sentiment casts rights violations as occurrences that prevent
the government from investigating guilty people, not as occurrences for which
non-guilty people can seek a remedy. This message, which is also engrained in
popular culture. surrounding criminal justice, is that for innocent people, rights
do not really matter much. Furthermore, the exclusionary rule's role as
practically the sole remedy for rights violations in the criminal procedure context
skews the litigation of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights.346 Nearly
everyone who asserts a violation of one of these rights in court does so in the
context of a motion to suppress evidence against her in a criminal case.347 This
fact gives any proposed reforms related to these rights an unsavory flavor. They
are so closely related to criminal defendants that many people think of them as
"rights for criminals."348
Tracey Maclin has argued persuasively that due to the heavily racialized
nature of interactions between black citizens and the police, courts should
consider a person's race in determining whether an encounter was coercive-
treating a reasonable black person differently from a reasonable white one.
Specifically, Maclin argues that courts should take race into account in their
"totality of the circumstances" assessments.349 The instant article may seem to
make a case for something similar along the lines of social class-just as David
341. Slobogin, supra note 339, at 335.
342. Id.
343. See Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.R. 1161,
1164 (1966).
344. See Young, supra note 23, at 85.
345. Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Survey Data, at Questions 1-5 (on file with
authors).
346. State v. French, 650 N.E.2d 887, 890 (Ohio 1995) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
855 (8th ed. 2005)).
347. Id. (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961)).
348. See Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 585, 589 (2011).
349. Maclin, supra note 110, at 268.
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Kessler, whose work suggests that age and gender affect whether a person feels
"free to leave" a police encounter, argues that courts should adopt a "reasonable
person of similar age" or "reasonable person of the same gender" standard.3"o
We do not advocate this approach. For one, a great many factors are salient in
police-citizen interactions. We are not convinced it would be a productive use of
courts' time to evaluate the difference between a "reasonable" young, poor Asian
man whose parents went to Yale, and a "reasonable" elderly, wealthy Latina
whose parents did not graduate from high school. It is not clear where this
inquiry would end, and to be meaningful, it would also need to take into account
factors such as the community's history with the police. But our more
significant objection to this approach is that it seems to take problematic patterns
as a given, then try to compensate for them, rather than figure out how to change
the patterns.
As we have said, we consider this study preliminary; it would be a mistake
to design reforms solely on its basis. Nonetheless, our findings point to the
deeply troubling conclusion that our criminal justice system contains rights-
protecting mechanisms that systematically and disproportionately disadvantage
poor people. For the Constitution to protect the most vulnerable, we need
measures that either ensure that the most vulnerable are willing to assert their
rights-and that these assertions will be respected-or measures that minimize
the importance of asserting specific rights in specific circumstances.35 1
Opposition to measures that would help people know and use their rights seems
to be grounded largely based on the fear that if people know about them, they
will actually use them. And investigations carried out on the backs of people's
ignorance are not investigations of which we should be proud.
B. Future Research
Our research suggests several psychosocial patterns in how constitutional
criminal procedure operates, and it will be important for future research to
examine these patterns in even greater detail. The present study has a few clear
shortcomings. For one, our sample size (n = 367) is too small to assess certain
kinds of effects-for example, to examine racial differences at a more granular
level. Additionally, the sample consists of people who are all attending some
kind of college, which leaves out people who have never attended college at all.
For this reason, if anything, our sample probably dilutes the effects of social
class and cultural capital, since the distribution on these measures is narrower in
350. Kessler, supra note 19, at 85.
351. See supra Part II.B.
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our sample than in the general population.352 Still, a larger sample, and one
more representative of the United States overall, would be ideal.
Since our results point to effects of social class and cultural capital, future
survey instruments should examine these factors in greater detail. Income,
wealth, occupation, parents' occupation, residence in a particular zip code, home
ownership, and other factors can be effective means of measuring various class
effects. The interaction effects between these measures and other variables such
as age and race could also be analyzed with a larger sample.
One of the ways this study differs from other recent studies about
constitutional criminal procedure is that we take the subject as a whole rather
than assessing just a part of it (e.g., Miranda or consent searches).353 While this
was a deliberate choice, and while we consider our broad approach to be a
strength rather than a weakness, our study design precluded us from testing any
one subject area exhaustively. Future studies can raise additional scenarios, or
focus more narrowly on a particular sub-area of constitutional criminal
procedure.
Additionally, it might be productive to look not just at the characteristics of
the person whose rights are at issue, but at the characteristics of the rights
themselves. That is, do the attributes of a particular right affect people's
orientation to it? For example, we might consider whether a right applies nearly
all the time-such as the right to be free from warrantless, suspicionless searches
of one's home354-or whether it is more situational-specific-such as the right to
counsel.355 Or we might consider whether a right is more latent-with greater
knowledge and/or action required to exercise the right-or manifest-with little
or no knowledge and/or action required to exercise the right. We might also
wonder about the difference between situations in which a person must exercise
a right and announce he is asserting it-as in Salinas v. Texas 35-versus those
in which he need only exercise it-such as walking away from an encounter with
357the police in which he is free to leave. Characteristics such as these may
correlate with patterns of knowledge and assertion, pointing to areas where
policy reform would be especially useful.358
352. In 2012, only 39.4 percent of the population ages 25-64 had at least an associate degree.
A Stronger Nation through Higher Education, LUMINA FOUNDATION 1, 3 (2014),
http://www.1uminafoundation.org/publications/A-stronger-nation-through-higher-education-
2014.pdf.
353. See generally Rogers, Implicit Assumptions, supra note 30, at 307 (discussing study
focused on Miranda rights); Chanenson, supra note 32, at 403-04 (discussing study focused on
consent searches).
354. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
355. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
356. 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178, 2180 (2013).
357. Id. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
358. In an earlier piece, an author set out a way to conceptualize rights along two axes: (1)
situational versus ubiquitous and (2) latent versus manifest. Young, supra note 23, at 87 fig. 1.
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Recently, scholars have expressed skepticism about a rights-based approach
to criminal procedure reform. Rachel Harmon has suggested that scholars look
too frequently to constitutional law and courts to solve the problem of how to
"regulate police officers and departments to protect individual liberty and
minimize the social costs the police impose while promoting these ends."359
Relatedly, Paul Butler has argued that focusing on Gideon v. Wainwright3 60 has
hindered reform and prevented broader, more productive scholarship and
advocacy about how to improve the plight of the poor in the criminal justice
system. While there is a great deal of merit to these critiques, and while
Butler and Harmon both suggest promising means of remedying substantive
inequalities, we believe that the reforms they suggest should augment, rather
than supplant, a rights-based approach. Simply, we are concerned that they risk
shifting focus away from core constitutional principles that should be given
teeth, not given up on.362
VII. CONCLUSION
This article represents a significant step forward in our empirical
understanding of constitutional criminal procedure. It is the first study to look
empirically at the relationship between social class and people's knowledge and
use of their Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights. Our findings point to a
powerful, largely hidden mechanism that contributes to existing inequalities in
the criminal justice system.
Still, more work is still needed. As it stands, we know a great deal more
about which people enter the criminal justice system than we do about which
factors determine who enters the system in the first place. Whether we look to
the Constitution or to public policy to make sure that rights are enforced, we
need to better understand the psychosocial mechanisms that affect how rights
operate in practice.
359. Harmon, supra note 106, at 762.
360. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
361. See Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique ofRights, 122 YALE L.J.
2176, 2178 (2013).
362. Harmon, for example, writes:
Nor can constitutional rights set the agenda for policing reform. Constitutional rights, by
their nature, take law enforcement interests into account ex ante and therefore are
inevitably drafted to provide generous minimum standards for law enforcement
conduct ... .The problem of policing instead requires an account of when law
enforcement should harm individual interests for societal ends, given the risks to human
dignity and the costs and benefits of law enforcement activity. Such an account
necessarily goes beyond constitutional rights.
Harmon, supra note 106, at 816-17.
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At times, the Supreme Court's lack of engagement with on-the-ground
questions about legal consciousness can give constitutional criminal procedure
an unsettlingly Potemkin flavor. Cases like Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,363
Oregon v. Bradshaw,36 and Salinas v. Texas365 are noteworthy for the
untested-and often unstated-normative premises on which they rest. If we are
serious about rights, we need to rethink issues of knowledge and assertion so that
people can, in a practical sense, use the rights they have. After all, a regime in
which people have rights, but do not know when they apply and are not willing
to use them, bears altogether too much resemblance to a regime in which these
rights do not exist at all.
363. 412 U.S. 218, 277 (1973).
364. 462 U.S. 1039, 1046 (1983).
365. 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2013).
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Proportions, Means and Standard Deviations for Variables Used in Analyses
VARIABLES University n Community n Total n
Sample College Sample
- Sample
Female .64 107 .60 245 .61 352
Age 19.92*** 107 22.04*** 243 21.39 350
(1.21) (6.78) (5.74)
White .50*** 108 .17*** 247 .27 355
Black .11 108 .13 247 .12 355
Other or Mixed Race .39*** 108 .70*** 247 .61 355
Hispanic .08*** 108 .53*** 247 .39 355
Not a Citizen .06* 107 .12* 245 .10 352
Searched or Arrested .19*** 108 .44*** 239 .36 347
Parent/Guardian College Degree .85*** 105 .35*** 228 .50 333
Rights Knowledge
Total Correct 3.95 108 3.98 247 3.97 355
(1.29) (1.48) (1.43)
Rights Assertion
Q1: Search Home .80 108 .73 247 .75 355
Q2: Answer Questions .62*** 108 .41*** 242 .47 350
Q3: Search Car .85*** 108 .58** 242 .67 350
Q4: Search Bag .59*** 104 .44*** 240 .49 344
Q5: Ask for Lawyer .50 107 .41 243 .43 350
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2. Rights Knowledge













Not a Citizen 0.328 0.363
(0.249) (0.260)
Searched or Arrested 0.149 0.198
(0.177) (0.181)
University * Female 0.785** 0.846**
(0.336) (0.342)
University * Hispanic -1.238** -1.235**
(0.525) (0.528)
Parent/Guardian College Degree 0.00572
(0.187)




Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<O.1
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Table 3.
VARIABLES Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 QS
Total Correct -0.0927 -0.0845 -0.161* -0.106 -0.128
(0.0915) (0.0796) (0.0842) (0.0799) (0.0794)
University 0.715* 1.075*** 1.285*** 0.570** 0.380
(0.373) (0.293) (0.341) (0.290) (0.282)
Female -0.333 -0.236 -0.176 -0.608** 0.226
(0.294) (0.253) (0.268) (0.253) (0.248)
Age -0.0310 0.0356* 0.00382 -0.0298 0.0407**
(0.0211) (0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0220) (0.0203)
Black 0.784 -0.528 0.258 0.480 -0.423
(0.512) (0.410) (0.440) (0.403) (0.400)
Other or Mixed Race 0.0517 0.216 0.156 -0.278 -0.154
(0.376) (0.327) (0.368) (0.328) (0.318)
Hispanic 0.242 0.0485 -0.264, 0.380 0.0551
(0.356) (0.305) (0.319) (0.306) (0.299)
Not a Citizen -1.013*** 0.642* -0.488 -0.470 0.200
(0.377) (0.372) (0.374) (0.379) (0.365)
Searched or Arrested 0.500 -0.0182 0.0503 -0.206 -0.0745
(0.312) (0.267) (0.275) (0.266) (0.262)
University * Hispanic -2.228***
(0.823)
Constant 1.927*** -0.851 1.044 1.281* -0.744
(0.723) (0.651) (0.675) (0.682) (0.641)
Observations 355 350 351 346 350
Log Likelihood -188.90 -229.69 -208.48 -228.60 -233.91
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Table 4. Rights Assertion
VARIABLES Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 QS
Total Correct -0.0918 -0.100 -0.159* -0.0717 -0.158*
(0.0939) (0.0820) (0.0890) (0.0822) (0.0827)
University 0.618 1.109*** 1.104*** 0.503* -0.278
(0.383) (0.309) (0.359) (0.305) (0.567)
Female -0.269 -0.297 -0.188 -0.652** 0.200
(0.298) (0.259) (0.279) (0.260) (0.256)
Age -0.0298 0.0365* 0.0173 -0.0250 0.0397*
(0.0214) (0.0205) (0.0212) (0.0219) (0.0207)
Black 0.877 -0.560 0.615 0.546 -0.422
(0.547) (0.429) (0.489) (0.426) (0.421)
Other or Mixed Race 0.0437 0.188 0.0863 -0.375 -0.0857
(0.377) (0.331) (0.379) (0.333) (0.326)
Hispanic 0.319 -0.00436 0.198 0.548* -0.137
(0.387) (0.331) (0.359) (0.333) (0.332)
Not a Citizen -0.948** 0.606 -0.613 -0.302 0.0576
(0.394) (0.388) (0.398) (0.391) (0.390)
Searched or Arrested 0.452 0.00506 0.0412 -0.302 -0.0101
(0.316) (0.273) (0.286) (0.273) (0.270)
University * Hispanic -2.224***
(0.831)
Parent/Guardian College Degree 0.166 -0.0669 0.952*** 0.181 -0.577*
(0.318) (0.281) (0.302) (0.278) (0.322)
University * Parent/Guardian 1.090*
College Degree
(0.646)
Constant 1.773** -0.715 0.205 0.980 -0.374
(0.767) (0.694) (0.727) (0.712) (0.691)
Observations 336 332 332 327 331
Log Likelihood -179.80 -217.38 -190.04 -215.81 -218.42
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